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I. INTRODUCTION
The Dalton Gang' was one of the most notorious gangs to ever roam the
Wild West. On the morning of October 5, 1892, the gang rode into
Coffeyville, Kansas intent on robbing two banks at the same time. 2 This
brazen act did not go unnoticed; before the outlaws were even able to enter
the banks, the townspeople recognized the group and issued a call to arms.
3
This town was not going to allow a gang of experienced highwaymen to rob
two of its banks uncontested, and no less than twelve townspeople took up
arms and positioned themselves around the banks.4 As the gang was trying
to tie their bags of money closed, shots began to ring out. A fierce gun
battle ensued lasting less than fifteen minutes. Once the smoke had cleared,
four gang members lay dead; their bodies proudly displayed and
photographed as a warning to criminals everywhere.6
The townspeople that day took part in "vigilante justice." 7 In carrying
out "vigilante justice" individuals carry out retributive actions after being
wronged. These acts are typically due to either not having or not seeing the
value in a legal remedy. In the above example, after recognizing that
outlaws were threatening their community, the townspeople of Coffeyville
became determined to exact the justice a primitive law enforcement was
incapable of providing. Fortunately, today the United States no longer
accepts the legitimacy of "vigilante justice"' and has come a long way from
the days of the Wild West when "vigilante justice" was a way of life.
Indeed, the United States has come to recognize the importance of
maintaining an orderly society through a judiciary, which ensures "equal
justice under law." 9 However, while the dispute settlement system in the
United States has evolved into a highly advanced and integrated system,
international disputes are still transitioning from a "vigilante justice" system,
known as "gunboat diplomacy,"' to a system reliant on courts ofjustice.
1. The Dalton Gang's Last Raid, 1892, EyeWitness to History, http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.
com/daltons.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2006).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Vigilantism, Vigilante Justice, and Victim Self-Help, North Carolina Wesleyan College,
http://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/300/300lectl 0.htm (last updated Oct. 28, 2004).
8. There is no mention of the government admonishing the townspeople for their preferred
method of executing justice.
9. "Equal Justice Under Law" is inscribed on the fagade of the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Building, Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/
courtbuilding.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2006).
10. See NOAH RUBINS & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, POLITICAL RISK
AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 433 (2005); Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez &
William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L.
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In the international sphere, courts of justice are more commonly referred
to as arbitral bodies or tribunals and continue to be plagued by a myriad of
difficulties. These difficulties are frequently cited by scholars and include
international tribunals' dubious legitimacy, interpretive incoherency,
inconsistent approaches to choice of law, inadequate arbiter accountability,
and inability to enforce awards and interim measures-just to name a few.
However, because there is no single integrated framework from which
international tribunals operate, the corpus of international justice is difficult
to critique as a whole. Accordingly, this article focuses on a narrow class of
international disputes and issues. Specifically, the discussion pertains to the
evolution of transparency and interpretive coherency between the dispute
resolution mechanisms in Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement"' (NAFTA) and Chapter 10 of the Central American Free Trade
Agreement' 2 (CAFTA), which govern disputes between individual foreign
investors and states in Central and North America. Although this article
focuses on two specific dispute settlement methodologies governing a
particular geographical region, the themes of transparency and coherency are
365 (2003); Ray C. Jones, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Dispute Resolution: A Shield to Be
Embraced or a Sword to Be Feared?, 2002 BYU L. REV. 527, 529 (2002) (quoting Matthew B.
Cobb, The Development of Arbitration in Foreign Investment, 16 Mealey's Int'l Arb. Rep. 2
(2001)); JAMES CABLE, GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY 1919-79: POLITICAL APPLICATIONS OF LIMITED
NAVAL FORCE (1981).
"Between 1820 and 1914 ... Great Britain alone engaged in at least forty armed interventions
into Latin America." Eduardo A. Wiesner, ANCOM: A New Attitude Toward Foreign Investment?,
24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 435, 441 (1993). Indeed, "[i]f foreign governments did violate
what Europe and the United States considered commercial law or market morality, gunboats could
seize the customs houses of the violators and manage them until debts were discharged." W.
Michael Reisman, International Arbitration and Sovereignty, 18 ARB. INT'L 231, 232 (2002).
11. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 2203, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
605, 702 [hereinafter NAFTA]. For a detailed outline of the history of NAFTA including the
legislative history, see Donald J. Musch, Summary of NAFTA Legislative History, in NAFTA:
NORTH AMERICAN FREE-TRADE AGREEMENTS Release 95-1, at 1-10 (James R. Holbein & Donald J.
Musch eds., 1995).
12. Central American Free Trade Agreement, May 28, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514, available at
http://www.ustr.gov.Trade -Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR-Final-Texts/Section-Index.
html [hereinafter CAFTA]. Parties to the convention include the United States, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic, but Costa Rica and the
Dominican Republic have yet to pass implementing legislation. CAFTA "reflects an understanding
that only through political, economic and social development can the Central American and
Caribbean parties build enduring democracies based on shared values and principles with the United
States." Regional Integration, United States Dominican Republic Central America Free Trade
Agreement, available at http://www.ustr.gov/ Trade Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTADR_
FinalTexts/SectionIndex.html. After CAFTA passed, President Bush issued a statement saying
that CAFTA represents "a commitment of freedom-loving nations to advance peace and prosperity
throughout the Western Hemisphere." President Bush, U.S. Trade Chief Applaud House Passage of
CAFTA, http://usinfo.state.gov/wh/Archive/2005/Jul/28-99143.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2006).
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hallmarks of a credible and legitimate dispute settlement system and thus,
issues of global import. Indeed, persuading states that international
settlement bodies are credible and legitimate remains a major impediment to
their continued evolution into reliable and successful tools for the peaceful
resolution of international disputes.
This article discusses the evolution of international dispute resolution,
principally the reforms to transparency provisions and the arbitral award
review process over the last ten years. Part II lays a foundation by reviewing
the historical background of investment disputes and their growing
importance in the global economy. Part III then highlights reforms to the
transparency provisions in CAFTA in the wake of NAFTA. Addressing
avenues for post-award review, Part IV examines the means to review an
award under CAFTA in light of the methods already implemented under
NAFTA. Arbitral decisions are cited where applicable and illustrative.
Additionally, Part IV discusses the advantages and disadvantages of
establishing an appellate body and proposes one possible framework.
Finally, Part V summarizes the observations made in the previous sections.
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. In the Beginning There Were Guns
John Locke in his Second Treatise of Government stated that an
effective governing body required three ingredients: (1) "an established,
settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the
standard of right and wrong;" (2) "a known and indifferent judge, with
authority to determine all differences according to the established law;" and
(3) "power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due
execution."' 3 In its early stages from the 18th century to the 20th century,
the international investment world lacked all of the ingredients prescribed by
Locke for a successful governing body. At that time, disputes were resolved
through "gunboat diplomacy." 14 This Darwinian model, divorced from law,
was prevalent and frequently displayed through exertions of force or threats
of force by imperial states to extract concessions from weaker host states. 15
1088
13. JOH-N LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 124-26 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980)
(1690).
14. See supra note 10.
15. See Alvarez & Park, supra note 10, at 367.
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B. Imperialism Gives Way to Autonomy
As the grip of the colonial powers waned, "gunboat diplomacy" slowly
evolved, at least in Latin American states, into a policy of state autonomy
referred to as the Calvo doctrine.' 6 Carlos Calvo, an Argentine jurist in the
late 19th century, developed this novel doctrine based on two criteria:
(1) sovereign states, being internationally equal and independent,
should enjoy the right to absolute freedom from interference by
other states, either through force or diplomacy; and (2) while aliens
should be given equal treatment with nationals, they are not entitled
to "extra" rights and privileges and thus may seek redress in local
courts. 17
This doctrine was a double-edged sword in paving the road for modem
day arbitral tribunals. 18 On the one hand, it slowed advancement by limiting
rights to those provided in the host state's law, which often precluded suits
against the government.' 9 Thus, the doctrine effectively prevented recovery
for foreign investors.2° Paradoxically, the Calvo doctrine was also novel by
providing an equal footing for both foreign and national investors.2'
However, in practice, local courts did not react favorably to foreign
16. Jones, supra note 10, at 529-30. The Calvo doctrine is embodied in Article 27 of the
Mexican Constitution. Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 27 (1917). This
doctrine has also been accepted in most Latin American jurisdictions. James R. Holbein & Gary
Carpentier, Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the Western Hemisphere, in
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS TREATY MATERIALS 32 (James R. Holbein & Donald
J. Musch eds., 1994).
17. Jones, supra note 10, at 530; see also DONALD R. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE: A PROBLEM
OF INTER-AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY 9-32 (1955).
18. See Denise Manning-Cabrol, The Imminent Death of the Calvo Clause and the Rebirth of the
Calvo Principle: Equality of Foreign and National Investors, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1169,
1169 (1995).
19. Before the United States enacted the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act, "the
United States applied the doctrine of restrictive immunity to claims against foreign states, but the
doctrine of absolute immunity to the execution of resultingjudgments." Charles H. Brower 1I,
Emerging Dilemmas in International Economic Arbitration: Mitsubishi, Investor-State Arbitration,
and the Law of State Immunity, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 907, 923 (2005).
20. Indeed, "the settlement of investor-state disputes ... constitutes a departure from traditional
practice in this field where ... a foreign investor was limited to bringing claim[s] against the host
state in a domestic court or having its home state assume his claim against the host state (diplomatic
protection)." Maryse Robert, Investment, in TOWARD FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 186, 202 (Jos6
M. Salazar-Xirinachs & Maryse Robert eds., 2001).
21. Manning-Cabrol, supra note 18, at 1169 (observing that "in a new world order based on
supranational organizations and individuals... one of the primary principles of the Calvo Doctrine
will be vindicated: equality of foreign and national investors").
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investors.22 Despite its inequities, the Calvo doctrine, as the prevailing view
in Latin American countries, served an important role during a transitional
period, which afforded arbitral institutions the time necessary to develop
advanced procedures for greater effectiveness and reliability in resolving
investment disputes.
C. A Global Law Emerges
At the center of the great transition from sovereign individualism to
collective harmonization was the destruction and tragedy of World War II.
The widespread collaboration in the after-math of World War II resulted in a
push for supra-national law, a critical development for successful
governance. 23 This led to the establishment of the United Nations (UN),
which immediately outlawed the use of force for disputes, including
investment disputes, between states.24  From these peaceful political
underpinnings came a rise in economic interaction between members of the
global community.25
The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT),2 6 which was
drafted concurrently with the UN Charter, received widespread support as
the economic equivalent to the politically minded UN.27 GATT was
initiated to lower trade barriers between states as a means of developing a
world market. 28 The agreement was revised and amended through the years
by various rounds of negotiations each often lasting several years.29 Despite
many revisions, GATT never reached it fullest potential because its dispute
resolution mechanism was unable to issue binding decisions for disputes
arising from its provisions.3 ° But in 1994, the Uruguay Round agreements
forever changed the landscape of the world economy by providing a process
22. Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection,
269 RECUEIL DES COURS 251, 413-14 (1997).
23. LOCKE, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
24. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapterl.htm
("All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations."). This was contrary to the long held belief by international
scholars that recovery of property was adequate justification for use of force under the law of
nations. 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS ch. I § 2, ch. 2 § 13 (A.C. Campbell trans.,
1814), available at http://www.constitution.org/gro/djbp.htm.
25. Robert, supra note 20, at 187 (noting that "the first BITs originated in Europe in the late
1950s").
26. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
27. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS:
CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 211-16 (4th ed. 2002).
28. Id. at 209.
29. Id. at 211-16.
30. Id.
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through which disputes could be definitively resolved.3' Specifically, the
Uruguay Round's sweeping reforms included the creation of an institution to
regulate and remedy violations of GATT free trade provisions.32 This
institution is known as the World Trade Organization (WTO) 33 and is a
major contributor to what we know today as globalization.34
The growth of a world market also led to the increase of domestic
legislation governing international economic issues. Specifically, the rise in
the number of foreign investors led to the development, particularly in
developing nations, of domestic investment laws, which often provided for
dispute resolution through a binding international arbitration in a neutral
country. 35 Fueled by competition between developing countries for foreign
investors and an increase in global trade, the late 20th century saw a rapid
proliferation of Bilateral and Multi-lateral Investment Treaties, (BITs and
MITs respectively), fostering the development of a supra-national
investment law.36 Indeed, "[a]t least thirty years before [NAFTA] took
31. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15 1994, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 2 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 14, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994)
[hereinafter Final Act].
32. "[W]hether dispute settlement works is going to be the litmus test of whether the WTO is
seen as a success or failure." Thomas L. Brewer, International Investment Dispute Settlement
Procedures: The Evolving Regime For Foreign Direct Investment, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 633,
647 (1995) (quoting Alan W. Wolff, Comment, in MANAGING THE WORLD ECONOMY 152, 154
(Peter B. Kenen ed., 1994)).
33. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, THE
LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTATIONS 4
(1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994).
34. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2005).
35. RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 10, at xxxiii.
36. Id.; Jones, supra note 10, at 530 (noting the "veritable explosion" in the number of BITs
entered into worldwide); Robert, supra note 20, at 186 ("Trade rules governing foreign investment in
the Americas have begun to converge in the 1990's."); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent
Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1521, 1528-29 (2005) ("In the 1990s alone, investment treaties
were negotiated at a rate of one every other day .... [and] the provisions .. .are remarkably
similar."). Furthermore, "in just the first quarter of 2004, ICSID registered as many new cases as the
entire ICSID caseload for the first fifteen years of the Centre's existence." Mark Kantor, The New
Draft Model U.S. BIT Noteworthy Developments, 21 J. INT'L ARB. 383, 383 (2004). BITs foster
more than the development of supra-national investment law. A recent study shows that adding a
BIT "play[s] a significant role in stimulating the inflows of investment" raising "inflows by an
average of 2.3 percent ... in South, East, and South-East Asian nations." Kim Sokchea, Bilateral
Investment Treaties, Political Risk, and Foreign Direct Investment 30-31 (2000), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=909760.
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effect, BITs had begun to both grant direct investor standing and to waive
the local remedies rule. 37
Although these BITs and MITs contain more expansive provisions than
the WTO, they are permitted under the WTO framework.38 It is hoped that,
while technically not creating a uniform platform for trade amongst all the
member states, these more expansive provisions between a few states will
encourage other nations to adopt expansive provisions and eventually lead to
adoption by the WTO.39 In particular, NAFTA and CAFTA are noteworthy
MITs because they not only further decrease trade barriers beyond that
which the WTO requires, but they also include provisions protecting foreign
investments. 40 The inclusion of investment provisions is unique 4 1 under the
WTO framework because investments are not extensively regulated in the
WTO.42 Specifically, NAFTA and CAFTA provide a distinct investment
disputes settlement process described as hybrid arbitrations. The arbitrations
are a combination of the WTO system 43 and the Calvo doctrine framework
44
by allowing an individual to bring a claim against a foreign sovereign for a
violation of international law.45
37. Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 1] in Its Tenth Year: An Interim Sketch of
Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1381, 1414 (2003) [hereinafter
Coe, Taking Stock].
38. GATT, supra note 26, art. XXIV, 5 (stating that "the provisions of this Agreement shall not
prevent, as between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a
free-trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs
union or of a free-trade area"). NAFTA and CAFTA are such multi-lateral agreements existing
within the WTO framework. This is so despite NAFTA (and other BITs and MITs) entering into
force before the formation of the WTO.
39. See Pierre Sauv&, Canada, Free Trade, and the Diminishing Returns of Hemispheric
Regionalism, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 237, 248-49 (2000); see also J. Michael Taylor,
Dispute Settlement Under the FTAA: An Apparent Melding of WTO, NAFTA and MERCOSUR
Approaches, 19 J. INT'L ARB. 393, 395 (Oct. 2002) ("An important underpinning of the GATT/WTO
framework is the idea that bilateral and regional trade agreements can lead to the ultimate facilitation
of international trade.").
40. Scott R. Jablonski, NAFTA Chapter 11 Dispute Resolution and Mexico: A Healthy Mix of
International Law, Economics and Policy, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 475, 476 (2004) (observing
that Chapter 11 "is unique among trade agreements in that it contains an entire chapter dealing with
foreign investment and the protection of such investment").
41. Chapter 11 provisions in and of themselves are not unique. Barton Legum, The Innovation of
Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA, 43 HARV. INT'L L. J. 531 (2002). Typically, investment
dispute provisions are governed in separate treaties known as Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) or
Multi-lateral Investment Treaties (MITs). See Antonio R. Parra, Provisions on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes in Modern Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Multilateral
Instruments on Investment, 12 ICSID REV. 287, 287-88 (1997).
42. Robert, supra note 20, at 189 ("Several agreements resulting from the Uruguay Round
include investment provisions, but there is no comprehensive agreement on investment."). For a
discussion on the implications of the Uruguay Round and the WTO on international investment
disputes, see Brewer, supra note 32, at 633.
43. State to State disputes for violations of international law (GATT/WTO provisions).
44. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
45. Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 37, at 1389-93; see also Jack J. Coe Jr., The Mandate of
Chapter 11 Tribunals-Jurisdiction and Related Questions, in NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW AND
1092
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D. Empowerment in Enforcement
Yet another of Locke's key ingredients for successful governance
46
emerged from the cooperation during the after-math of World War II-the
establishment of a reliable means for enforcing international arbitral awards.
The vehicle that transformed this area of international arbitration was the
New York Convention. 47 The New York Convention entered into force in
1959 and has since been ratified by 142 States.48  The widespread
acceptance is of great import because each signatory State must enforce
arbitral awards subject only to the limited exceptions contained in the
Convention.4 9 Indeed, municipal courts are limited to review for fraud,
noncompliance with an agreement to arbitrate, or contrary to public policy,
but may not review an award on its meritsI ° Thus, all international
commercial disputes between members of signatory States, who choose to
settle their grievances through arbitration, will have a reliable means of
enforcing their award. A reliable means for enforcing arbitral awards is
important because it reduces the risks associated with cross-border
transactions and thereby enhances international economic cooperation."
E. The Final Ingredients
As Locke concluded, a successful governing body must also have "a
settled law" and "a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine
ARBITRATION: PAST ISSUES, CURRENT PRACTICE, FUTURE PROSPECTS 215, 218 (Todd Weiler ed.,
2004) [hereinafter Coe, The Mandate] ("Compared to the traditional espousal model, Chapter 11
presents a striking departure. To a limited extent a private entity, not ordinarily endowed with
international personality, may bring its own claim for breaches of international law-a prerogative
not dependent on the investor's state adopting the claim as its own."); Franck, supra note 36, at 1538
("[P]lac[ing] the enforcement of public international law rights in the hands of private individuals
and corporations ... w[as] a major innovation.").
46. LOCKE, supra note 13.
47. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (1959) [hereinafter New York Convention]; see 9 U.S.C. § 201.
48. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) keeps track
of the signatories to the New York Convention. UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitraltexts/arbitration/NYConventionstatus.htmI (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
49. New York Convention, supra note 47, art. III. ("Each Contracting State shall recognize
arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory
where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles." ).
50. Judith Wallace, Corporate Nationality, Investment Protection Agreements, and Challenges to
Domestic Natural Resources Law: The Implications of Glamis Gold's NAFTA Chapter 11 Claim, 17
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 384 (2005).
51. William W. Park, Private Disputes and the Public Good: Explaining Arbitration Law, 20
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 903, 904 (2005).
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all differences according to the established law."52 This encompasses both
an independent adjudicator and a mechanism that prevents disparate
judgments. While increases in foreign investments have prompted the
adoption of uniform investment laws and a uniform enforcement
mechanism, the procedural aspects of adjudicating investment disputes
adopted by international dispute settlement bodies, such as the International
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)53 and the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),5 4 remain
widely varied,55 despite attempts to integrate and formalize the process.5 6 A
robust dispute resolution process is essential to effectuate one's rights
because an increasing number of unresolved investment disputes or disparate
outcomes will have a negative impact on future investment and development
and strain diplomatic relations between the governments involved."7
52. LOCKE, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
53. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid;
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Rules of Procedure for
Arbitration Proceedings (1985), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/.
54. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A.R. 98, U.N. GAOR, 31st Session, Supplement No. 39 at
182, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976); UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
G.A.R. 72, U.N. GAOR 40th Session (1985), available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral texts/arbitration/1985Modelarbitration.html. The difference between the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Arbitration is that the Model
Law provides arbitration provisions for national governments to incorporate into their domestic law
and the Arbitration Rules govern the conduct of a tribunal during a proceeding. UNCITRAL, FAQ -
UNCITRAL and Private Disputes/Litigation, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/
arbitrationfaq.html#difference.
55. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Dispute Settlement, at 3-4, available
at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intltemlD=2741&lang--l (noting that UNCITRAL
and the WTO have general commercial arbitration provisions and NAFTA, the Association of
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSURE) have
arbitration provisions specific for the settlement of investment disputes). In addition, there remain a
myriad of institutions from which to choose to govern international investment disputes. These
include ICSID, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), UNCITRAL, the LCIA (formerly
known as the London Court of International Arbitration), the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), and the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC). Fortunately,
NAFTA and CAFTA refer the parties in a dispute to particular institutions. For example, in Articles
1120 and 10.16(4) of NAFTA and CAFTA respectively, parties are referred to ICSID or
UNCITRAL arbitration.
56. The development of the ICSID in 1985 and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Arbitration in 1985 was significant in forming basic procedural guidelines for arbitral tribunals in
investment disputes. Jones, supra note 10, at 530 (ICSID and UNCITRAL "enabled private
investors to bring claims before binding arbitral bodies without dependence upon their home
governments").
57. See Brewer, supra note 32, at 636-37; see also Rosine M. Plank-Brumback, Dispute
Settlement, in TOWARD FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 255 (Jos6 M. Salazar-Xirinachs & Maryse
Robert eds., 2001) ("The dispute settlement provisions within trade agreements serve as an
important guarantor that the parties will fulfill the substantive commitment they have made and
realize the benefits they expected to derive from these agreements.").
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1. Advantages to Arbitration
Business managers traditionally favor arbitration over foreign courts in
overseas transactions. First, foreign claimants often avoid foreign courts
because of the inherent bias associated with host state judges. 58
Furthermore, arbitration affords the parties autonomy to tailor the
proceedings to meet their needs.5 9 From a pragmatic standpoint, arbitral
awards are easier to enforce than judgments from foreign state courts. 6 0 In
practice, businesses will be more likely to invest when there are reliable
means available to recover losses for improper conduct.61 In sum, the
advantages of arbitration are a "level litigation playing field" where "[r]ules
of an impartial institution can be applied by a relatively neutral tribunal
convened in a mutually accessible country . . . in a common language
according to rules that give neither side an undue advantage. 62
58. Alvarez & Park, supra note 10, at 369 (noting that "the real or imagined bias of host country
judges can create an anxiety that inhibits wealth-creating transactions and discourages cross-border
economic cooperation, and will inevitably either thwart cross-border economic cooperation or add to
its cost").
59. Autonomy includes:
[T]he freedom to select those who will settle the dispute, the place of arbitration, the law
that will govern the resolution of the dispute, and the applicable language . . . . In
addition, arbitration is considered expeditious, cost effective, and a more flexible
procedure than one governed by the technicalities of the law court.
Remigius Oraeki Chibueze, The Adoption and Application of the Model Law in Canada: Post-
Arbitration Challenge, 18 J. INT'L ARB. 191, 192 (2001).
60. See supra notes 36-51 and infra notes 191-97 and accompanying text (discussing the New
York Convention). A foreign court's judgments are often difficult to enforce because "there are no
world-wide treaties relating to either forum selection agreements or judicial judgments." GARY B.
BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 8 (2d ed.
2001); see also Chibueze, supra note 59, at 192 (observing that "given the absence of multilateral
conventions for the recognition of foreign judgments, even where a foreign judgment is satisfactory,
there is often doubt about whether the decision can be enforced in another country") (citation
omitted); Richard M. Mosk & Ryan D. Nelson, The Effects of Confirming and Vacating an
International Arbitration Award on Enforcement in Foreign Jurisdictions, 18 J. INT'L ARB. 463,
463-66 (2001) (discussing the differences between enforcing a foreign judgment and an international
arbitral award).
61. Alvarez & Park, supra note 10, at 368 (noting that "[u]ntrustworthy enforcement
mechanisms tend to chill cross-border economic cooperation to the detriment of those countries that
depend most on foreign capital for development").
62. William W. Park, Private Disputes and the Public Good: Explaining Arbitration Law, 20
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 903, 905 (2005); see also Charles H. Brower II, Structure, Legitimacy, and
NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 65 (2003) ("To depoliticize
investment disputes, and to level the playing field between foreign investors and host states, Chapter
II commits investment disputes to the process of international commercial arbitration .... ).
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2. The Calvo Doctrine's Demise
Despite receiving the same benefits of arbitration,63 State systems
entrenched with the Calvo doctrine 64 may enter into the arbitration fray with
greater trepidation.65 Scholars have noted:
It is at first sight perhaps difficult to understand why governments
would voluntarily limit their sovereignty by submitting to such
processes of arbitration-enforced discipline. One needs to realise,
though, that by accepting such external, politically less malleable,
discipline a country gains in reputation, in lowering its political risk
reputation and by enhancing its ability to participate and benefit
fully from the global economy. Governments who don't are seen as
higher risk and therefore penalised, usually with good reason, in
many ways by investors and the global markets. Submitting to such
external disciplines also provides governments with a defense
against domestic pressure groups-business lobbies and ideological
interest groups-which can often capture the domestic regulatory
machinery and manoeuvre it for protectionist policies which in the
end damage the country at large and wealth-creating potential of the
global economy. 
66
Implicitly agreeing with this reasoning, Mexico broke with a century of
tradition in putting aside the Calvo doctrine and replacing it with the dispute
resolution mechanism in Chapter 11 of NAFTA when NAFTA came into
effect on January 1, 1994.67 This was also the case for Costa Rica, Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, who
replaced the Calvo doctrine with the dispute resolution mechanism found in
Chapter 10 of CAFTA.68 Turning from a sheltered, protectionist stance that
63. W. Michael Reisman, International Arbitration and Sovereignty, 18 ARB. INT'L 231, 235
(2002). ("[T]he government that hosts an international transaction or is a party to it is, ordinarily,
unwilling to subject itself to the jurisdiction of the national courts of the foreign investor. Hence the
need for a neutral forum, which modem international commercial arbitration provides."). The author
continues: "Because governments are committed to national development and are perforce involved
in the global wealth process, they and their agencies will inevitably be involved in arbitrations with
foreign entities." Id. at 239.
64. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 16 and infra note 68.
66. RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 10, at xxxiv (2005) (quoting THOMAS WALDE & TODD
WEILER, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION UNDER THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY IN THE LIGHT OF NEW
NAFTA PRECEDENTS, INVESTMENT TREATIES AND ARBITRATION 159, 161 (G. Kaufmann-Koehler
& B. Stucki, eds., 2002)).
67. Office of NAFTA and Inter-American Affairs, http://www.mac.doc.gov/nafta/implement.
html (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
68. See SHEA, supra note 17, at 21 (stating that the Latin American republics of Costa Rica,
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras used the General Treaty of Peace and Amity, Arbitration, and
Commerce, concluded on September 25, 1906, to eliminate diplomatic protection);
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allowed only municipal courts to have jurisdiction over foreign investment
disputes, to a stance that cedes jurisdiction over foreign investment
disputes 69 to international arbitral tribunals under NAFTA and CAFTA
constituted a dramatic development.
F. The Evolution of Investment
Before looking in detail at the differences between the provisions and
structure of NAFTA and CAFTA dispute resolution mechanisms, it is
important to understand the scope of "investment," which is the subject of
the protective provisions in Chapter 11 and Chapter 10 of the respective
agreements and traditionally referred to as "foreign direct investment.' 7 °
Historically, "foreign direct investments" referred to direct and indirect
control of at least a ten to twenty-five percent in assets or in an enterprise.71
Once this threshold is met, the investment is considered a direct investment
rather than a "portfolio investment.,
72
Foreign direct investments "may best be defined as the creation,
acquisition or endowment in the host country of enterprises, either
incorporated as branches, subsidiaries, or associate companies, or in
the form of unincorporated enterprises or joint ventures. The
desired result is to acquire a lasting interest, with powers of
management and control, where the investor's return depends upon
the performance of the enterprise.
73
However, Chapters 11 and 10 of NAFTA and CAFTA respectively cast
a wide net in defining investment.7 4 The definition includes both foreign
see also Pellerano & Herrera, Jurisdiction of Dominican Courts, DOMINICAN TODAY,
http://www.dominicantoday.com/app/article.aspx?id=3455 (last visited Dec. 23, 2006); Bernardo M.
Cremades, Disputes Arising Out of Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America: A New Look at the
Calvo Doctrine and Other Jurisdictional Issues, DISPUTE RESOLUTION JOURNAL (May-July 2004),
available at http://www.findarticles.con/p/articles/mi_qa3923/is.200405/ai n9377090; Gonzalo
Biggs, The Latin American Treatment of International Arbitration and Foreign Investments and the
Chile-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, ICSID REVIEW-FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW JOURNAL,
available at http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:LIMLhq491QMJ:www.camsantiago.com/html/
archivos/espanol/articulos/03Biggs%2520article.pdf+nicaragua+calvo+doctrine&hl=en&gl=us&ct-
clnk&cd=7&client=firefox-a.
69. Provided the foreign investor is a national of a signatory state to CAFTA or NAFTA.
70. See generally Brewer, supra note 32.
71. Id. at 634 n.2.
72. Id.
73. Klaus Peter Berger, The New Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Globalizing the
Investment Insurance Approach Towards Development, 15 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 13, 17 (1988).
74. Coe, The Mandate, supra note 45, at 239 ("The activities establishing the essential
1097
direct investments and portfolio investments, and tribunals have yet to
restrict its scope.75 CAFTA's definition is particularly noteworthy because
of its introductory statement that does not appear in NAFTA's definition.
7 6
CAFTA defines investment as "every asset that an investor owns or controls,
directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, including
such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the
expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.",77 CAFTA, thereby,
broadens the scope of investment beyond the already expansive language in
NAFTA. 5 Examples of investments include mortgages, liens, licenses,
intellectual property rights, moveable or immoveable property, stocks,
bonds, or enterprises.79 Because of the ubiquitous reach of investment,
80
tribunals, have unbridled discretion to hear disputes arising under Section A
of Chapters 11 and 10 of NAFTA and CAFTA, s' which provide substantive
rights to foreign investors. The most frequently disputed rights82 include
national treatment,83 fair and equitable treatment,84 and expropriation.85
'investment' are broadly defined in Article 1139, and the continuum of qualifying investor activity
that definition includes-'seeks to make, is making or has made'--extends standing to activity
spanning the life of an investment. Indeed, the 'or has made' language of Article 1139 was
influential in Mondev, where it did not defeat the claim that the investment in question had come to
an end, and indeed had done so before January 1, 1994-NAFTA's effective date." (citing Mondev
Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2 80 (Sept. 20, 1999))).
75. Robert, supra note 20, at 192; Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 37, at 1399.
76. CAFTA, supra note 12, art. 10.28.
77. Id. (emphasis added). The definition of investment in CAFTA is analogous to the definition
in the Model U.S. BIT, which incorporates the exception found in NAFTA Chapter 11 's definition
excluding tangible or intangible property not "acquired in the expectation or used for the purpose of
economic benefit or other business purpose." NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 1139.
78. Rajesh Singh, The Impact of the Central American Free Trade Agreement on Investment
Treaty Arbitrations: A Mouse that Roars?, 21 J. INT'L ARB. 329, 330 (2004).
79. See CAFTA, supra note 12, art. 10.28; see also NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 1139 (definition
of investment).
80. Investment does not include a minimum threshold of ownership interest and incorporates
both foreign direct investments and portfolio investments.
81. Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 37, at 1399.
82. Id.
83. National treatment requires the host nation to treat foreign investors the same as local
investors. Robert, supra note 20, at 196 ("The intent is to avoid cases in which investments-and
investors-of other parties cannot compete on equivalent terms with those of the host state."). A
similar provision known as most favored nation treatment creates an obligation that the state treat
foreign investors from a particular country the same as a foreign investor from any other foreign
country. Id.
84. Id. at 194 ("Fair and equitable treatment is a general concept without a precise definition.").
It requires certain minimum protections for a foreign investor in compliance with international law
separate from the requirements of the domestic laws. Id. It is effectively an international due
process standard requiring access to courts and police protection at the level required by
international law. CAFTA, supra note 12, art. 10.5(2)(a); NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 1105, 1115;
see also Alvarez & Park, supra note 10, at 394. This provision has taken preeminence as the "alpha
and omega" of Chapter 11 disputes. Brower, supra note 62, at 68.
85. Expropriation involves government interference with private property, usually transferring
ownership from a private person to the state or another person. James W. Weller, International
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Now that the types of claims brought before an arbitral tribunal under
CAFTA and NAFTA have been reviewed, the following compares and
evaluates the transparency provisions and the award review processes within
the respective agreements' dispute resolution mechanisms.
III. BALANCING TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENTIALITY
Traditionally, the United States has favored settlement of international
investment disputes through arbitration. 6 In the past decade, however, a
contagion of disfavor has taken hold. 7 The cause of this attitude swing
from the time NAFTA was enacted to the time CAFTA was negotiated is
not difficult to find.88 Criticism was sparked because a foreign investor
invoked, for the first time, the private right of action, so novel to the dispute
settlement mechanisms in investor disputes, against the United States.89
After a foreign investor was able to sue the United States, the public viewed
this individual and the foreign tribunal rendering the award as usurping
democratic control. 90 Due to the considerable criticism regarding the ceding
Parties, Breach of Contract, and the Recovery of Future Profits, 15 HOFSTRA L. REv. 323, 325-26
(1987) (stating that "[e]xpropriation is usually defined as conduct by the host state which deprives an
alien of substantially all benefits derived from property interests within the host state"). It is
allowed, however, if the expropriation is for a public purpose, done in a non-discriminatory manner
and in accordance with due process, and compensation is "prompt, adequate, and effective."
NAFTA, supra note 11, art. II10; CAFTA, supra note 12, art. 10.7; Robert, supra note 20, at 201
(citing U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull).
86. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, List of Contracting States
and other Signatories of the Convention, (Jan. 25, 2006), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/constate/c-
states-en.htm.
87. See Brower, supra note 62, at 59 ("While recognizing that Chapter I I's drafters apparently
took measures to overcome legitimacy problems, it suggests that the remedies frequently prove more
troublesome than the disease."). It seems the dissent in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc. is now becoming the popular view. 473 U.S. 614, 665 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Like any other mechanism for resolving controversies, international arbitration will
only succeed if it is realistically limited to tasks it is capable of performing well-the prompt and
inexpensive resolution of essentially contractual disputes between commercial partners. As for
matters involving the political passions and the fundamental interests of nations, even the
multilateral convention adopted under the auspices of the United Nations recognizes that private
international arbitration is incapable of achieving satisfactory results.").
88. Alvarez & Park, supra note 10, at 393 (highlighting the Methanex, Loewen, and Mondev
cases to show Americans "[c]hanging hats from a capital exporter's fedora to a host state's
sombrero").
89. Permitting a private right of actions cuts both ways. This was the first time the United States,
and for that matter any industrialized country, was forced to act as a respondent due to the
mandatory arbitration agreement within NAFTA. Alvarez & Park, supra note 10, at 370 (noting that
American attitudes toward arbitration were favorable when the tribunals correct behavior of foreign
host states but turns sharply against arbitration when the United States is accused of wrongdoing).
90. Indeed, "[a] dispute resolution process that had been fair for the rest of the world came to be
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of sovereignty to these tribunals on key political and economic matters
Congress passed legislation limiting arbitration in international treaties. 91
Accordingly, this part focuses on the transparency reforms incorporated into
CAFTA's dispute resolution mechanism, and the next part discusses the
reformed process for review of arbitral decisions. 92
First, it is important to distinguish transparency from its counterpart
confidentiality. Transparency is the full and timely disclosure of
information, whereas confidentiality is the withholding of information
relating to a party. 93 Confidentiality has been hailed as one of the great
advantages of arbitration. 94 Confidentiality serves the parties' interests in
several ways. By keeping proceedings confidential, parties are able to keep
allegations of bad faith and bad business practices from the public, thus
enabling the party to maintain a good business reputation. 95 Furthermore,
the public remains unaware of losses suffered resulting from adverse
tribunal decisions. 96  In addition, party autonomy inherent in arbitral
proceedings allows parties to agree on the level of confidentiality so that
they are able to keep from the public, and sometimes the other party,97
information critical to the livelihood of a business like trade secrets and
other sensitive business information.
98
Despite these purported benefits of confidentiality, transparent systems
also have significant appeal. While businesses may not want the bad press
an adverse award would bring, releasing tribunals' decisions and reasoning
will "lead to development of and consistency in the law of arbitration." 99
Releasing awards will also allow similarly situated parties to avoid the
seen as a tool to put business before public interest." Alvarez & Park, supra note 10, at 371.
91. See infra note 123; see also Alvarez & Park, supra note 10, at 370-71. NAFTA's creation of
a private right of action against signatory states for violations of its substantive provisions rarely
exists in trade agreements. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 27, at 1146.
92. For a topical list of differences between the dispute settlement systems in Chapter II of
NAFTA and Chapter 10 of CAFTA, see Appendix A.
93. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000).
94. Cindy G. Buys, The Tensions between Confidentiality and Transparency in International
Arbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 121, 122 (2003).
95. Id. at 123.
96. Id.
97. FED. R. EVID. 508. The Advisory Committee Notes state that the most common measure to
protect trade secrets is "simply to take the testimony in camera," but "[o]ther possibilities include
making disclosure to opposing counsel but not to his client, making disclosure only to the judge, and
placing those present under oath not to make disclosure." Id. (internal citations omitted); see also
CAL. EVID. CODE 1061 (providing that in the courts discretion a judge may require "[tihat the trade
secret may be disseminated only to counsel for the parties").
98. Buys, supra note 94, at 123.
99. Id. at 136 (adding that "well-written and reasoned awards can and do have persuasive value
and 'can coalesce into a collective arbitral wisdom' that may be drawn upon by future parties and
arbitrators" (quoting Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unity Theory of Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1085 (2000)). A consistent rule
of law would have an additional positive affect by deterring re-litigation of a settled issue of law.
1100
[Vol. 34: 1085, 2007] Wild West to World Order
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
mistakes that gave rise to the previous dispute, thus cutting down on future
disputes. 00 Finally, bringing- transparency to the entire process would
enable scholars and practitioners to better critique the system as a catalyst
for creating a more responsive and efficient system. '01
Recent studies have shown that confidentiality may not be as highly
valued as previously thought and may in fact depend on the context of the
dispute.'0 2 For example, in a public or semi-public0 3 arbitration, arguments
in favor of transparency are compelling. Transparency is especially
important in the semi-public investment arbitrations under NAFTA and
CAFTA because the decisions usually a large number of people than a
private arbitration.'04 For example, in a semi-public investment arbitration
an adverse decision can affect citizens of a state by requiring a state to
change its laws or by requiring a state to pay a specified award, which comes
from tax revenue. 0 5 A state's enforcement of adverse decisions hinges on
whether that state supports the tribunal's authority, and a transparent system
that advances the precepts of democracy will garner such support in at least
two important respects. 0 6 First, through the franchise, the public fulfills its
role as a check on government action, and the more information that is made
available, the better the public is able to fulfill this role by holding the
government accountable for positions taken in arbitral proceedings.1
0 7
Second, it will allow more people to participate at the various stages of the
proceeding as a third party in the dispute or as a voice in the public forum.
This will add credibility to and inspire confidence in the system. 108
100. Id.
101. Id. at 137. Information at a lower level of granularity, through a transparent process, parties
will be better equipped to determine whether a particular arbitrator is most suitable to be their
selection in future arbitral proceedings. Id.
102. Id. at 122-23 (citing Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer, What Do Parties Really
Want From International Commercial Arbitration?, AAA DISPUTE RESOLUTION JOURNAL 78 (Nov.
2002/Jan. 2003)).
103. Involving at least one state party.
104. Jack J. Coe Jr., Domestic Court Control of Investment Awards: Necessary Evil or Achilles
Heel Within NAFTA and the Proposed FTAA?, 19 J. INT'L ARB. 185, 190 (2002) [hereinafter Coe,
Achilles Heel] ("[T]he ability of interested persons to occupy the court's galleries demystifies the
process ...."); see also Buys, supra note 94, at 134.
105. Buys, supra note 94, at 134.
106. Id.; see also President George W. Bush, Address at United Nations General Assembly (Sept.
21, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040921 -3.html (stating that
"democracy simply means good government rooted in responsibility, transparency, and
accountability").
107. Buys, supra note 94, at 134, 136.
108. Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 37, at 1434 (stating that "legitimacy of the process and result
[would] be enhanced if the rigor and care attending Chapter 11 proceedings were open to public
scrutiny"); see also Brower, supra note 62, at 71 (asserting that "adherence to fundamental values,
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A. ICSID and UNCITRAL - Influential Procedural Guidelines
Because NAFTA and CAFTA require the parties in a dispute to choose
ICSID'1 9 or UNCITRAL rules to govern the procedural aspects of their
dispute,1 0 it is necessary to briefly review the pertinent confidentiality
provisions in the ICSID and UNCITRAL rules. UNCITRAL, while not
incorporating a duty of confidentiality, requires proceedings "be held in
camera unless the parties agree otherwise""' and also requires "[t]he award
... be made public only with the consent of both parties.""1l 2  Similarly,
ICSID does not allow a tribunal to hold open proceedings" 3 without the
consent of the parties,"14 but does require a tribunal to publish the legal
reasoning of its award. "5 While nothing in ICSID or UNCITRAL addresses
such as accountability, transparency, and democratic participation, becomes an element essential to
the perceived legitimacy of investor-state arbitration"); Buys, supra note 94, at 134, 136 (citing
Contribution of the United States to the Improvement of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of
the WTO Related to Transparency, TN/DSIW/13 (Aug. 22, 2002)). Buys noted further that
confidence in the fairness of arbitral proceedings will increase pressure on governments to enforce
the awards. Buys, supra note 94, at 134, 136.
109. Under NAFTA, neither Mexico nor Canada is a signatory to the Washington Convention.
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, List of Contracting States and other
Signatories of the Convention, (Jan. 25, 2006), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/constate/c-states-
en.htm. However, the United States is a signatory, so disputes in which one of the parties is, or
from, the United States, then the ICSID Additional Facility may be used. International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Additional Facility Rules art. 2(a), at 10-11, (Apr. 2006),
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility.htm [hereinafter Facility Rules].
110. NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 1120(1); CAFTA, supra note 12, art. 10.16(4).
111. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), G.A. Res. 31/98,
Rule 25.4, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (Dec. 1976), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf.
112. Id. at Rule 32.5.
The UNCITRAL Model Law Working Group refrained from inserting a provision on
publication of awards. Indeed it was observed: "It may be doubted whether the Model
Law should deal with the question whether an award may be published. Although it is
controversial since there are good reasons for and against such publication, the decision
may be left to the parties or the arbitration rules chosen by them."
Dr. Loukas A. Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation UPS v. Canada and Methanex
Corp v. United States, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES
FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 169, 174
(Todd Weiler ed., 2005) (quoting UNCITRAL Secretariat's note A/CN9/207; Howard Holtzmann &
Joseph Neuhaus, A GUIDE TO THE UNICTRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMENTARY (Kluwer Law International)).
113. Facility Rules, supra note 109, art. 39(2), at 61; International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) art. 32(2), at 115 (Apr. 2006), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
basicdoc/basicdoc.htm.
114. See Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Provisional Measures, I ICSID Reports 410, Dec. 9,
1983 (noting that "it is right to say that the Convention and the Rules do not prevent the parties from
revealing their case").
115. Accordingly, the names of the parties and the underlying facts of the dispute will remain
confidential. See Facility Rules, supra note 109, art. 53(3), at 68; see also International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) art. 48(4), at 122 (Apr. 2006), http://www.worldbank.
org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm.
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confidentiality of the written submissions, based on the practice of tribunals,
it is clear that they will keep these documents confidential.' 16 Consequently,
both ICSID and UNCITRAL provide parties with the ability to regulate the
transparency of their proceedings. The following discussion pertains to the
overriding confidentiality agreements made in NAFTA and CAFTA that
govern arbitral proceedings notwithstanding the default provisions in ICSID
and UNCITRAL. 117
B. NAFTA: An Emerging Transparency
While NAFTA may have been a groundbreaking treaty by spreading
free trade across the Americas and allowing citizens to sue foreign states
before international tribunals," 8 the text is curiously silent as to
confidentiality and transparency. The only reference to transparency
pertains to the publication of awards. This is found in Article 1137(4),
which refers to an annex in which the United States and Canada allow an
investor, or the host state, to publish an award if they are a disputing
party. 1 9 However, in this same annex Mexico asserts that it will follow the
local arbitration rules, 21 which under ICSID and UNICTRAL only allow
publication of awards with consent from both parties. 12'
Because the text of NAFTA is silent, arbitral tribunals proceed
according to their standard practice, which is to cloak the proceedings,
submissions, and awards in secrecy. 22  The subsequent outcry from the
media and scholars regarding the lack of transparency in the arbitral
process 23 led to the drafting of The Notes of Interpretation (Interpretations)
116. See Note on NAFTA Commission's July 31, 2001, Initiative to Clarify Chapter 11 Investment
Provisions, International Institute for Sustainable Development, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf
/2001/tradenafta_aug200l.pdf.
117. However, the default provisions in ICSID and UNCITRAL remain very important in practice
because NAFTA and CAFTA are often silent with regard to confidentiality, thus effectively
incorporating the default provisions of ICSID or UNCITRAL absent agreement between the parties.
118. Under Chapter 11, NAFTA "creates 'a private right of action' [for violations of its
substantive investment protection provisions] that is quite unusual in the world of trade agreements
.... " JACKSON ET AL., supra note 27, at 1146; see also Alvarez & Park, supra note 10, at 393 ("The
unique aspect of NAFTA lies in its creation of a private right of action by which foreign investors
bypass the political hurdles to obtaining the diplomatic protection of their home country.").
119. See NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 1137(4), Annex 1137.4
120. See NAFTA, supra note 11, Annex 1137.4.
121. See supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
122. See Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Note on NAFTA Commission's July 31, 2001, Initiative to
Clarify Chapter 11 Investment Provisions, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/200l/trade-
naftaaug2001 .pdf [hereinafter Initiative].
123. Initiative, supra note 122.
In one New York Times article NAFTA arbitration was thus described: "Their meetings
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for NAFTA Chapter 11.124 These Interpretations were released in 2001 to
"clarify and reaffirm" the meaning of certain provisions. 125 The Ministers
involved in drafting the provision clearly indicated that the purpose of the
Interpretations was to "impose openness on the proceedings.' ' 2 6 However,
the text of the Interpretations is much less clear. It states: "Nothing in
the NAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality on the disputing
parties to a Chapter Eleven arbitration, and, subject to the application of
Article 1137(4), nothing in the NAFTA precludes the Parties from providing
are secret. Their members are generally unknown. The decisions they reach need not be
fully disclosed. Yet the way a small group of international tribunals handles disputes
between investors and foreign governments has led to national laws being revoked,
justice systems questioned and environmental regulations challenged."
Alvarez & Park, supra note 10, at 383 (quoting Anthony DePalma, NAFTA's Powerful Little Secret,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, §3, at 1). Anthony DePalma, NAFTA 's Powerful Little Secret, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, §3, at 1 ("The lack of a traditional appeal process, transparency and legally
binding precedent, along with the wide scope of what can be challenged under the free-trade
investment rules, have made many people wary in all three nations."); Editorial, The Secret Trade
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2004, at A26 ("[T]he arbitration process ... is often one-sided,
favoring well-heeled corporations over poor countries, and must be made fairer than it is today.
Unlike trials, arbitrations take place in secret. There is no room in the process to hear people who
might be hurt .... There is no appeal."); HOWARD MANN, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. &
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS: A GUIDE To NAFTA'S
CONTROVERSIAL CHAPTER OF INVESTOR RIGHTS 46 (2001); HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON
MOLTKE, NAFTA's CHAPTER 11 AND THE ENVIRONMENT: ADDRESSING THE IMPACTS OF THE
INVESTOR-STATE PROCESS ON THE ENVIRONMENT 7, 62 (1999) (stating that "the absence of
transparency leads to a significant loss of democratic legitimacy" and "like a cancer ... erode the
democratic legitimacy of the entire international ... investment regime").
NAFTA was attacked because the lack of confidentiality provisions left arbitral tribunals to
continue their normal practice of keeping every aspect of the dispute secret. Initiative, supra note
122; see also Coe, Achilles Heel, supra note 104, at 190 (stating that "the in camera feature of
international arbitration, and the confidentiality that attaches to certain of its aspects, has produced
alarm in some quarters"). This was demonstrated in two important cases. Metalclad Corp. v. United
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, Award 13 (Aug. 30, 2000) (determining that
neither NAFTA nor the ICSID Additional Facility Rules restrict the parties from disclosing
information); The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/3, Decision
(Sept. 28, 1999) (determining that, although beneficial when a state is a party, there was no duty to
disclose certain documents).
For a contrary argument to disclosing information when a state is a party, see Buys, supra note
94, at 123 (noting that if a dispute is made public, a state may be forced to take a position to please
certain constituencies).
124. NAFTA Free Trade Comm'n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions,
Preamble (July 31, 2001), http://www.intemational.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-en.asp?format=
print [hereinafter Interpretation]. "The flurry of investor rights litigation under Chapter 11 has led
the NAFTA parties to consider modifying Chapter 11. For now, they have settled on some
'clarifications,' adopted by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission. Some of them relate to procedural
matters involving access to confidential information." JACKSON ET AL., supra note 27, at 1166.
125. Interpretation, supra note 124.
126. Initiative, supra note 122; see also Pettigrew Welcomes NAFTA Commission's Initiatives to
Clarify Chapter 11 Provisions, News Release, Dep't of Foreign Affairs and Int'l Trade (Aug. 1,
2001), http://wOl .intemational.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec=/Min-Pub Docs/104441 .htm
(quoting Minister Pettigrew: "We are committed to making the investor-state dispute settlement
process in NAFTA as open and transparent as possible.").
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public access to documents submitted to, or issued by, a Chapter
Eleven tribunal."1
27
While remaining neutral on the publication of awards, the
Interpretations take a slightly more aggressive stance on the publication of
documents submitted to and received from the tribunals. Although the
Interpretations are supposed to "clarify and reaffirm," Section A(2)(b)
provides for a "positive commitment" 128 by obliging "[e]ach Party . . . to
make available to the public in a timely manner all documents submitted to,
or issued by, a Chapter Eleven tribunal."' 129 However, there are at least three
reasons why this "positive commitment" is not as novel as it may seem.
First, the Interpretations make no mention of opening hearings to the
public."30 Second, the Interpretations do not discuss the disclosure of pre-
arbitration documents. 3 ' And third, Section A(2)(b), obliging disclosure of
documents submitted to or issued by the tribunal, excludes confidential
business information, privileged or protected information under a party's
domestic law, and information a party must withhold according to the
applicable arbitral rules. 3 2  While the first two exceptions under Section
A(2)(b) reflect international confidentiality standards, the third has the
potential to render this "positive commitment" devoid of meaning, because
"all tribunals to date have established strong rules of secrecy."'' 33 In sum,
despite the Ministers' lofty aspirations in drafting the Interpretations, they
fell short of imposing openness but still accomplished a great deal by
breaking down the presumption of secrecy in arbitral tribunals and opening a
dialogue between the parties and the tribunals on the drafting of
confidentiality orders. 134 More recently, in light of Congress' intent to bring
transparency to Chapter 11 proceedings and the provisions in other free-
trade agreements, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representatives (USTR) and
127. Interpretation, supra note 124, § Al.
128. Initiative, supra note 122 (noting that "[t]his level of access .. is beyond even what the
Methanex Tribunal had agreed to grant IISD in the event that it is successful in its petition to
intervene in that case as a friend of the court"). For a discussion about the legitimacy of the
Interpretations, see Alvarez & Park, supra note 10, at 397-98; see also Brower, supra note 62, at 85
(stating that "the Commission's work product may often be vulnerable to allegations that it crosses
the line between bonafide interpretation and ultra vires amendment").
129. Interpretation, supra note 124, § A2(b).
130. Initiative, supra note 122.
131. Id.
132. Interpretation, supra note 124, § A2(b)(i)-(iii).
133. Initiative, supra note 122.
134. Id. (contending that "the success of the statement will depend on whether it is reflected in
future orders of the arbitral Tribunals").
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Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs issued statements agreeing to open
Chapter 11 proceedings to the public. '35
C. CAFTA: Transparency Gains a Foothold
As opposed to NAFTA's lackluster transparency reforms, 3 6 CAFTA
evinces an evolution by requiring transparency during the dispute settlement
process. '37 This is a significant departure from the original draft of NAFTA
and the Interpretations."'3 CAFTA was designed to comply with Congress'
trade objectives. According to the USTR:
[Negotiators] have taken steps to enhance transparency and public
involvement in the investor-State dispute settlement process.
[CAFTA] provides that hearings will generally be open to the
public and that key documents submitted to or issued by an arbitral
tribunal will be publicly available, subject to the protection of
confidential business information. It also expressly authorizes
tribunals to accept and consider amicus curiae submissions,
whereby the public could present views on issues in dispute. 139
135. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Statement on Open Hearings in NAFTA
Chapter Eleven Arbitrations (Oct. 7, 2003), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Regional/
NAFTA/assetupload.filel43_3602.pdf?ht (last visited Feb. 13, 2007); Canadian Dept. of Foreign
Affairs and Int'l Trade, Statement of Canada on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven
Arbitrations, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/open-hearing-en.asp (last visited Feb. 13,
2007).
136. While the reforms may have been minimal, it is important to note that "all major interim
awards, and all final awards, issued by NAFTA Chapter 11 have been made available to the public."
David A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the United States -
Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 679, 747-48 (2004).
137. This evolution was apparent in earlier free trade agreements such as those signed with
Singapore, Chile, Australia, Bahrain and Morocco. U.S.-Sing. Free Trade Agreement, arts. 15.
20, 4.6, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/SingaporeFTA/Final_
Texts/asset-uploadfile708_4036.pdf; U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, art. 22.10(l)(a), http://
www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Chile-FTA/Final-Texts/asset-upload-file683_40
16.pdf; U.S.-Austl. Free Trade Agreement, art. 20, http://ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/
AustraliaFTA/FinalText/SectionIndex.html; U.S.-Bahr. Free Trade Agreement, art. 17, http://
ustr.gov/Trade.Agreements/Bilateral/BahrainFTA/finaltexts/SectionIndex.html; U.S.-Morocco
Free Trade Agreement, art. 18, http://ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/MoroccoFTA/Final_
Text/SectionIndex.html.
138. However, it is congruent with the recent comments made by the USTR and Canadian
officials that they will make Chapter 11 disputes open to the public. See supra note 130. According
to these press releases, arbitral tribunals should not proceed under their default rules but pursuant to
the revised agreement between the countries to make the proceedings transparent. Id. However,
when Mexico is a party to a dispute, the proceedings will still be cloaked in secrecy. See supra
notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
139. The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement-Impact
on State and Local Governments, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/109cong/dr-cafta/
CAFTAState-LocalReport-final6-15-051 .pdf.
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Indeed, CAFTA tracks precisely the language of the U.S. Model BIT. 1
40
Article 10.21 of CAFTA requires tribunals to open proceedings to the public
and make available all written submissions, including the notice of intent,
the notice of arbitration, pleadings, memorials, minutes or transcripts of the
proceedings, and orders, awards, and decisions. 14' The required disclosures
retain exceptions for a party's domestic disclosure laws and essential
security interests. 42 However, the provisions expunge the maligned
exception for protections afforded under the arbitral rules. 143  CAFTA
further fosters a transparent and open process through its amicus provision,
which allows non-parties to participate by submitting briefs.'" The
provision authorizes a tribunal to consider amicus briefs without either of the
disputing parties' consent. 4  It is hoped that the liberalized amicus brief
provision will foster greater confidence in the investor dispute settlement
process by placing more information before the tribunals, thus equipping
members to reach more equitable decisions. 46  Additionally, opening the
submissions and hearings to the public will bolster the credibility of the
process and avoid the dreaded label "secret." 1
47
D. Illustrations: Metalclad 14 8 and Methanex'
41
The Metalclad Corporation brought a claim against Mexico for
preventing Metalclad from opening a toxic waste processing plant, after it
was built, for failure to get a municipal permit. 5 0 The tribunal assembled to
handle the dispute addressed the question of confidentiality as a preliminary
issue.' 51  Mexico requested that the tribunal order Metalclad to keep
140. Compare CAFTA, supra note 12, art. 10.21(1)-(5) with 2004 Model BIT art. 29(l)-(5) (they
are identical).
141. CAFTA, supra note 12, arts. 10.21(l)(a)-(e), 10.21(2).
142. CAFTA, supra note 12, art. 10.21(2)-(5) (protecting information essential for security in
order to maintain international peace and security).
143. See CAFTA, supra note 12, art. 10.21.
144. CAFTA, supra note 12, art. 10.20(3).
145. Id.
146. Cf U.S. R. 37.1 ("An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court relevant
matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable help to the Court.").
147. DePalma, supra note 123.
148. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (Aug. 30,
2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/mm-award-e.pdf.
149. Methanex Corporation and the United States of America, NAFTA Claims, http://naftaclaims.
com/disputes.us_.6.htm.
150. See Metalclad, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/I, 28-69.
151. Id. Later on in the proceedings, the tribunal purportedly found the requirement of
transparency within NAFTA. Alvarez & Park, supra note 10, at 376 (stating that the tribunal found
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information regarding the dispute confidential. 15 2 In refusing to issue such
an order, the tribunal correctly noted that nothing in NAFTA or ICSID
prescribed a duty of confidentiality on the parties, and that absent an express
agreement between the parties, no such duty arose.'53 However, the
president of the tribunal, imbibed with the historical practice of arbitral
secrecy, issued a statement of caution to Metalclad, suggesting that
"limit[ing] public discussion of the case to a minimum would conduce the
orderly unfolding of the arbitral process and enhance working relations
between the parties." 1
5 4
The Methanex tribunal handled a claim from a Canadian investor that
California was unfairly targeting them by prohibiting the use of MTBE in
gasoline.'55  There were, of course, several environmental groups in
California that wished to be heard on the issue. 5 6  The tribunal held that
their entrance into the normal private sphere of arbitration was neither
allowed nor prohibited by NAFTA Chapter 11 and the UNCITRAL rules. '57
The tribunal decided, based on notes from the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the
WTO, and the practice of the ICJ, that it was within the scope of Article
15(1) of NAFTA to admit amicus petitions.'58 Interestingly, despite the
tribunal's determination that a party could submit amicus briefs, the tribunal
also decided that Article 25(4) of UNCITRAL, requiring that the proceeding
that "Mexico breached a NAFTA requirement of 'transparency'); see also Brower, Emerging
Dilemmas, supra note 19, at 922 n.53 (stating that the tribunal in Metalclad "defin[ed] 'fair and
equitable treatment' to include an element of transparency"). The tribunal states that imposing a
transparency requirement is pursuant to its duty to interpret fair and equitable treatment in
accordance with international law, and furthermore, transparency is "[p]rominent in the statement of
principles and rules that introduces [NAFTA]." Metalclad, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 76
(citing NAFTA Art. 102(1)). However, the tribunal limits its transparency requirement "to include
the idea that all relevant legal requirements for the purpose of initiating, completing, and
successfully operating investments made, or intended to be made, under the Agreement should be
capable of being readily known to all affected investors of another Party." Id. Thus, despite being a
prominent principle of NAFTA and international law, the tribunal's transparency requirement does
not carry over to the arbitral proceedings themselves.
152. Clyde C. Pearce & Jack Coe Jr., Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Some Pragmatic
Reflections Upon the First Case Filed Against Mexico, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 311,
330-31 (2000).
153. Id. at 331 & n.71; Mistelis, supra note 112, at 181 (stating that "neither the NAFTA nor
ICSID Additional Facility Rules contained any express limit on the parties' freedom to publicise
information divulged during the arbitration"). Also, in Loewen v. USA, the tribunal stated that a duty
of confidentiality would be undesirable because "it would restrict public access to information
relating to government and public matters." Id. For an example of a Chapter 11 proceeding
implementing UNCITRAL rules where the parties agreed to an open proceeding and the tribunal
allowed amicus briefs, see id. at 191-95 (discussing United Parcel Service of America v. Canada).
154. Pearce & Coe, supra note 152, at 331-32.
155. See Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Final Award of the Tribunal
on Jurisdiction and Merits (Aug. 3, 2005), available at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/
USA/Methanex/MethanexFinal-Award.pdf.
156. Id. at ch. F(2).
157. Seegenerally id.
158. Mistelis, supra note 112, at 188.
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be in camera, prevented the amicus petitioner from attending the oral
hearings or receiving arbitration materials without the parties' consent. 5 9
This seriously proscribes amicus petitioners' abilities to meaningfully
contribute to the proceedings, as they are forced to proceed based on what
limited information is released to the public. 160
Under CAFTA, the tribunal would not be faced with such a difficult
decision because CAFTA adopts a revolutionary stance toward the treatment
of third parties in investment arbitral proceedings. 161  CAFTA expressly
states, "[t]he tribunal shall have the authority to accept and consider amicus
curiae submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party."'
162
Thus, there will be no doubt that the arbiters may accept and consider third-
party submissions, but arbiters also retain discretion to deny amicus curiae
submissions, which they are more likely to exercise if accepting the briefs
would overburden the parties. 1
63
E. Concluding Remarks on Transparency
It is too early to tell how the public will react to the revamped
transparency provisions for investment dispute settlement proceedings.
However, it is clear that Congress has responded to the criticisms regarding
transparency and made significant reforms in their negotiating and drafting
159. Id. at 189.
160. One scholar has contended that amicus provisions in NAFTA are deficient:
First, because the tribunals did not give potential amici the right to receive pleadings or to
attend hearings, the decisions contribute little to the promotion of transparency. Second,
because potential amici have no right to obtain pleadings and because the recent
decisions only contemplate the receipt of helpful submissions, one wonders (1) whether
potential amici can formulate informed submissions, (2) whether tribunals will accept
uninformed submissions, and (3) whether the recent decisions really advance the cause of
meaningful participation. Third, assuming that tribunals will accept amicus submissions
from NGOs, this may not promote democratic participation because many NGOs have
very specific agendas and are not accountable to their own members, much less to the
general public. Thus, despite their best efforts, Chapter I1 's ad hoc tribunals may seem
illegitimate because they do not serve the fundamental values of accountability,
transparency, and democratic participation.
Brower, supra note 62, at 72-73 (citations omitted).
161. Canada and the U.S. recently agreed to allow amicus petitioners to participate in NAFTA
Chapter 11 disputes to the same extent that they participate in CAFTA disputes. Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR) on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations (Oct.
7, 2003), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Regional/NAFTA/asset-upload-filel43-
3602.pdf; Canadian Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Int'l Trade, Statement of Canada on Open Hearings
in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/open-hearing-
en.asp (last visited Dec. 23, 2006).
162. CAFTA, supra note 12, art. 10.20(3); see supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
163. Mistelis, supra note 112, at 189.
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strategy to affect change that reflects democratic ideals. 64  Despite the
reforms, if an arbitral award forces domestic policies of the United States to
change, criticism is likely to take aim at provisions that ostensibly do not
neatly fall within the democratic mold. For example, the validity of an
international appellate body and the constitutionality,165 of the arbitrator
selection process will be discussed further. 166  While the greater
transparency provisions in CAFTA may quiet the thunder of protest, with
larger problems looming, this lull may turn out to only be the eye of the
storm.
IV. GARNERING UNIFORMITY: THE "APPELLATE" PROCESS
As a preliminary matter, under both NAFTA and CAFTA, parties are
required to waive their rights to bring a claim for the alleged violation in an
alternate venue once the claim is submitted to a tribunal. 67  This limits
parallel decisions, 68 and the possibility that a court where the judgment or
award is brought for enforcement has to choose between enforcing the
arbitral award or the foreign judgment. 69  A more serious problem facing
the dispute settlement mechanism is "the decentralized nature of Chapter 1 1
adjudication[, which] naturally results in a measure of divergence among
164. See supra notes 136-46 and accompanying text (discussing reforms in CAFTA).
165. Discussed infra Part IV. Brower, supra note 62, at 68 (noting that "[a]d hoc tribunals based
on the commercial arbitration model also create legitimacy concerns due to their perceived failure to
conform to historical practice and to incorporate fundamental values of the governed community").
166. Id. at 66 (commenting that "creative lawmaking by unrepresentative tribunals seems
undemocratic and almost certain to yield unpedigreed outcomes"); see also DePalma, supra note
123, at Cl (noting that the tribunals are "ad hoc panels drawn from lists of academics and
international lawyers almost unknown outside their highly specialized fields"); George A. Bermann,
Constitutional Implications of U.S. Participation in Regional Integration, 46 AM. J. COMP. L.
(SupP.) 463, 469 (1998).
167. NAFTA, supra note 11, art. l121(l)(b); CAFTA, supra note 12, arts. 10.18(2)(b),
10.18(4)(b). CAFTA differs from NAFTA by precluding not only bringing a claim in domestic
court after initiating arbitral proceedings, but also precluding arbitral proceedings if the claimant
"previously submitted the same alleged breach to an administrative tribunal or court of the
respondent, or to any other binding dispute settlement procedure, for adjudication or resolution."
CAFTA, supra note 12, art. 10.18(4)(b). This provision would have changed the outcome of the
Azinian v. United Mexican States if the claim had arisen under CAFTA rather than under NAFTA,
because Azinian initiated proceedings in the domestic administrative agencies and then appellate
courts of Mexico. See generally Azinian v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2
Award (Nov. 1, 1999), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/robertaward.pdf.
168. Under NAFTA especially, parallel proceedings can arise if a claim submitted to a national
court before submission to a tribunal or if a claim is submitted concurrently but based on violations
of state law rather than violations of NAFTA. For a discussion on the complexities surrounding
parallel proceedings, see ANDREA K. BJORKLuND, The Continuing Appeal of Annulment: Lessons
from Amco Asia and CME in International Investment Law and Arbitration, in LEADING CASES
FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 471, 516-
21 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005).
169. See supra note 60 (discussing the difficulty in enforcing foreign state awards).
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tribunals."17  Because of legitimacy concerns due to the potential for
inconsistent results, disquiet with the review mechanisms arose
concomitantly with the criticism of the lack of transparency. 1"1
A. NAFTA: Review and Consistency
Under NAFTA, three avenues have been paved to review or alter
arbitral awards. 172 First, this section addresses the ability and effectiveness
of the contracting parties to issue binding interpretations of NAFTA. Next,
this section discusses the scope of review at the enforcement stage. And
finally, this section reviews a municipal court's ability to vacate or annul a
tribunal's decision and gives an illustrative example. 173
1. Notes of Interpretation
One way the drafters of NAFTA tried to bolster coherency, credibility,
and predictability in its dispute resolution mechanism was by allowing the
parties to agree on binding interpretations of NAFTA provisions, which then
become part of the governing case law for Chapter 1 1 disputes. 174 Allowing
binding interpretations could potentially enhance the "pedigree" of the
opinions and indirectly incorporate "democratic accountability and
participation into the Chapter 11 process,"' 175 while at the same time creating
uniform case law amongst the tribunals. However, instead of using the
170. Coe, The Mandate, supra note 45, at 252.
171. See supra note 123.
172. Another means provided for in NAFTA, is the ICSID internal review procedures. However,
neither Mexico nor Canada is a signatory to ICSID, so this method of review remains unutilized.
The World Bank Group: ICSID, List of Contracting States and other Signatories of the Convention,
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/constate/c-states-en.htm. In addition, municipal courts may
comment on or disagree with arbitral decisions when a party brings an action in municipal court
subsequent to an arbitral award. In that case, the municipal court should give the award res judicata
effect or at least collateral estoppel for the specific issues decided by the tribunal. See CHRISTOPHER
R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND PROBLEMS 578 (2002). However, there
remains the possibility that the municipal court may decide to allow the superfluous proceeding to
continue and review the merits of the dispute possibly overturning or modifying the arbitral award.
Id. (discussing Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 982 P.2d 229 (Cal. S. Ct. 1999)).
173. NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 1136(3); see also Coe, The Mandate, supra note 45, at 217 n.6
(noting, for example, that "domestic courts, when engaged, functionally are the ultimate arbiter of
tribunal jurisdiction"); Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire
Strikes Back, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43, 47 (2001) (commenting on Canada's and Mexico's
attempts to use annulment proceedings to "essentially give courts in Canada, Mexico, and the United
States the final authority to interpret and apply Chapter I l's substantive obligations").
174. NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 1131(2).
175. Brower, supra note 62, at 75.
1111
interpretations to bolster the legitimacy of the Chapter 11 dispute resolution
mechanism, in practice the first time this procedure was invoked to draft the
Notes of Interpretations of 2001, the effect was further discord. 
176
Rather than a panacea, the Interpretations were viewed as an illegitimate
amendment to substantive rights in NAFTA and a severe curtailment of
other rights. 177 First, the Interpretations require parties to "make available to
the public in a timely manner all documents submitted to, or issued by, a
Chapter 11 tribunal."'178  There is, however, nothing in the original draft of
NAFTA that imposes such a duty, and imposing one under the guise of an
interpretation is an assault on common sense. 179 After all, the scope of the
drafter's authority did not include amending NAFTA provisions. 8 ° Their
duty was to simply interpret the provisions therein.' 8' Second, the
Interpretations state that "fair and equitable treatment" does not require
anything more than "that which is required by the customary international
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens."'182 This severe curtailment of
rights provided for under the "fair and equitable treatment" clause is
contrary to the plain meaning of the language and thus, a violation of the
obligation to interpret "in accordance with . . . international law."'18
3
Specifically, this interpretation is seen as a violation of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which has risen to the level of
176. Interpretations, supra note 124 and accompanying text.
177. See Brower, supra note 19, at 926 (contending that the Interpretations were a "crude
assertion[] of unrefined power"); see also Jack J. Coe, Jr., The State Of Investor-State Arbitration -
Some Reflections on Professor Brower's Plea for Sensible Principles, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 929,
955 (2005) (observing that "the cardinal risk of undue government interference resides in the
interpretive note feature initiated in NAFTA Chapter 11 and found in successor texts").
178. NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions §
A2(b) (July 31, 2001), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-lnterpr-en.asp
[hereinafter Notes of Interpretation]. See supra notes 124-35 and accompanying text (discussing
these provisions in greater detail).
179. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, at 23 (2002) (UNCITRAL), available at http://www.
appletonlaw.com/cases/Pope_.%20Award%2ORe%20DamagesMay31-02.pdf (concluding that the
Interpretations were really amendments).
180. Amending NAFTA would have required "more formal procedures and a higher degree of
political scrutiny." Brower, supra note 62, at 84.
181. NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 1131(2); Brower, supra note 62, at 85-86 (noting that tribunals
may not have the authority to determine whether the interpretations are legitimate and may have to
accept the interpretations as conclusive or else face "cascading allegations of ultra vires conduct
[that] have no logical end"); see supra notes 120-35 and accompanying text (discussing the
Interpretations); see also CAFTA, supra note 12, art. 10.22(3) (providing that the Interpretations will
be binding on a tribunal established under the Agreements and adding that "any decision or award
issued by the tribunal must be consistent with that decision").
182. Notes of Interpretation, supra note 178.
183. NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 102(2); see also Brower, supra note 62, at 79-81 (arguing that
restricting the plain meaning of fair and equitable treatment to the most egregious forms of
government misconduct violates international law and thus "undermines the legitimacy of their
work").
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customary international law and requires treaties to be interpreted in
accordance with their plain meaning. 
184
Moreover, notwithstanding the label attached to these provisions, the
text itself "contain[s] significant ambiguities that merely increase the room
for debate."' 185  For example, fair and equitable treatment is defined in
accordance with the "customary international law minimum standards."'1
86
This language leaves significant room for interpretation by arbitrators,
because customary international law is notoriously imprecise.' 8 7  Finally,
requiring the Interpretations to be applied to pending disputes without public
comment or warning impinges upon their legitimacy. Taken to the extreme,
the use of Interpretations may be seen merely as a "tool to gratify narrow
self-interests."' 88  It was Locke's view that the judge must remain
"indifferent" and have "authority to determine all differences according to
the established law,"' 189 but by allowing parties to change the law to achieve
their desired outcome, 190 the Interpretations set a dangerous precedent that
undermines the legitimacy of the process Locke envisioned.
184. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
185. Brower, supra note 62, at 78. The Notes of Interpretation mandate that claims be based on
customary international law; that fair and equitable treatment only prohibits egregious, outrageous
and shocking government conduct; and that external treaty provisions should not be considered in
applying Article 1105(1). See Notes of Interpretation, supra note 178. However, these binding
interpretations could lead to disparate results because a tribunal could find that a more inclusive
definition of fair and equitable treatment has risen to a level of customary international law or that
violation of other treaty provisions constitutes unfair treatment. Brower, supra note 62, at 78-79.
186. See Notes of Interpretation, supra note 178.
187. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (2005)
(suggesting that "the behavioral regularities associated with customary international law lack the
universality or robustness posited by the traditional account"); see also Coe, supra note 177, at 947
(noting that "[i]ntemational law specialists, accustomed to the decentralized sources upon which the
system depends, tolerate a measure of indeterminacy").
188. Brower, supra note 62, at 81-82. The Interpretations were seen as a tool to direct the
outcome of the Pope & Talbot case. Howard Mann, NAFTA 's Investment Chapter: Dynamic
Laboratory, Failed Experiments, and Lessons for the FTAA, 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 247, 256
(2003). The Pope & Talbot case was pending at the time the Interpretations were passed,
and Canada was both a disputing party in the case and a member of the Free Trade Commission
who passed the Interpretations. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, PP 6-7 (2001) (UNCITRAL), http://
www.appletonlaw.com/cases/Pope_%20Award%2ORe%2ODamagesMay31-02.pdf. The tribunal in
Pope had interpreted "fair and equitable treatment" more broadly than the Interpretations allowed, so
the tribunal decided to evaluate it under the new standard but still found Canada in breach. See
NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 1105; Mann, supra at 256.
189. LOCKE, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
190. See Interpretations, supra note 124.
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2. Reviewing an Award at the Enforcement Stage
Another means of review is through "recognition and enforcement" of
an award by municipal courts.'9 ' Article 1136(6) of NAFTA provides for
enforcement of arbitral awards under the ICSID Convention, the New York
Convention, or the Inter-American Convention. 92  The most amenable for
enforcement of awards is the New York Convention. The United States,
Mexico, and Canada are all signatories to the New York Convention, which
provides limited review by municipal courts of arbitral decisions. 193 Article
III of the New York Convention provides that "Each Contracting State shall
recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them ... [and] [t]here shall
not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions.., on the recognition
or enforcement of arbitral awards ... than are imposed on the recognition or
enforcement of domestic arbitral awards."' 194 In this respect, the New York
Convention provides uniformity in municipal courts for the enforcement of
awards. However, the Convention also gives limited grounds upon which a
municipal court may refuse to enforce an award.' 95 Specifically, there are
seven basic grounds: (1) the parties were under some incapacity or the
agreement to arbitrate is not valid; (2) insufficient notice of the appointment
of the arbitrator or proceedings was given to the party who the award is
against, or the party was otherwise unable to present his case; (3) the award
or decision is not contemplated or outside the terms of the submissions to
the arbitration; (4) the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance
with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; (5) the award is
not yet binding or was set aside by a competent authority of the country in
which that award was made; (6) the subject matter is incapable of settlement
by arbitration under the law of the country where the award is being
enforced; or (7) the award would be contrary to the public policy of the
country where the award is being enforced. 196 Courts in the United States
191. New York Convention, supra note 47, art. V(1).
192. NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 1136(a).
193. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De L'lndustrie Du Papier
(RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974); Lander Co. v. MMP Invs., Inc., 107 F.3d 476 (7th Cir.
1997); Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Mgmt., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
194. New York Convention, supra note 47, art. III.
195. Id. art. V(1).
196. Id. art. V. See Gary H. Sampliner, Enforcement of Nullified Foreign Arbitral Awards:
Chromalloy Revisited, 14 J. INT'L ARB. 141, 145-48 (1997) (discussing the negotiation history of
New York Convention art. V(1)(e)). Complications arise when a party attempts to enforce an award
in a foreign state after being set aside or annulled in a municipal court. William W. Park, Duty and
Discretion in International Arbitration, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 805, 805 (1999) (noting the foreign
court's burden of balancing "two rival policies: extending comity to foreign judgments and
enforcing arbitral awards"); see also Sampliner, supra, at 161 (arguing that municipal courts should
"permit[] enforcement of nullified foreign awards when the enforcing courts find the nullification
decisions to be arbitrary or clearly erroneous, in addition to any decisions that are proven to have
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typically view these grounds narrowly and challenges to enforcement are
usually unsuccessful.' 97 While this "reliable" means of enforcement is in
fact narrow, it is also deceptive because of the relatively broad discretion to
set aside an award given municipal courts "of the country in which, or under
the law of which, that award was made."' 98  It is to this area of broad
discretion in annulment proceedings that the discussion now turns.
3. Setting Aside the Award at the Seat of Arbitration
Municipal courts at the situs are able to "revise, set aside or annul the
award... ."99 This procedure is known as vacatur and is of greater import
to the legitimacy of the Chapter 11 dispute resolution mechanism.200
Because the New York Convention sets strict standards for the enforcement
stemmed from corruption, bias, or which violate the public policy of the enforcing country [because
this standard] would give deference to the decisions of the courts of the country of origin ... while
at the same time honouring the choice of the contracting parties to resolve their dispute by final and
binding arbitration").
Compare In re Chromalloy Aeroservices, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996) (enforcing an award
previously set aside by municipal courts in Egypt) with Baker Marine Ltd. v. Chevron, 191 F.3d 194
(2d Cir. 1999) and Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica S.p.A., 71 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(refusing to enforce awards that were previously set aside); see also Dana H. Freyer, United States
Recognition and Enforcement of Annulled Foreign Arbitral Awards - The Aftermath of the
Chromalloy Case, 17 J. INT'L ARB. 1, 2 (April 2000); Richard M. Mosk & Ryan D. Nelson, The
Effects of Confirming and Vacating an International Arbitration Award on Enforcement in Foreign
Jurisdictions, 18 J. INT'L ARB. 463, 472-74 (2001); Eric A. Schwartz, A Comment on Chromalloy
Hilmarton, d l'amkricaine, 14 J. INT'L ARB. 125, 134 (1997) (concluding that "it is not for the [U.S.
District Court in Chromalloy] to save U.S. parties from choices imprudently made ... nor does it
serve the cause of international arbitration particularly for the courts of one country to disregard the
legitimate right of another country to determine the rules governing arbitrations conducted on its
territory... ").
197. DRAHOZAL, supra note 172, at 536.
198. New York Convention, supra note 47, art. V(l)(e). A United States court has held that
despite the clause "or under the law of which, that award was made" that "any suggestion that a
Court has jurisdiction to set aside a foreign award based upon the use of its domestic, substantive
law in the foreign arbitration defies the logic both of the Convention debates and of the final text,
and ignores the nature of the international arbitral system." See Int'l Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas
Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, 745 F. Supp. 172, 176-77 (1990). But a court in India held that its
courts were competent to set aside an award made in London like any other domestic award.
Charles H. Brower II & Jeremy K. Sharpe, The Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudication System, 19
ARB. INT'L 414, 415 (2003) (citing Nat'l Thermal Power Corp. v. Singer Co. 18 Y.B. COM. ARB.
407 (1993)).
199. NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 1136(3)(b)(ii).
200. Annulment proceedings will enhance the legitimacy only if the state courts abide by the
tradition of limited review. Brower, supra note 62, at 74, n.203 (opining that "[i]n modem
international practice, courts may use 'annulment' to rectify gross procedural injustices (such as
excess of jurisdiction or denial of the right of audience), but not mistakes of law" (citing GARY B.
BORN, INT'L COM. ARB. 708-09 (2d ed. 2001))).
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of the awards2"' but leaves "setting aside or suspension" of an award to the
throws of domestic law,202 the ambiguity of "revise, set aside or annul"
allows "courts to exercise any degree of review permitted by municipal
law," which will inevitably differ and lead to disparate results.20 3
Furthermore, "even when limited to questions of arbitral excess, courts may
define their role so broadly as to firmly abut the boundary between merits
review and mere consideration of the tribunal's mandate. 2 4 For example,
while incorporating Article V of the New York Convention into domestic
legislation in Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act 205 for enforcement of
arbitral awards, the United States allows a much more liberal standard of
review for annulment proceedings.2 °6 Indeed, in several cases United States
courts have adopted a "manifest disregard" standard.20 7 This is essentially a
heightened level of review for mistakes of law and gives courts in the United
States the power to overturn tribunal awards despite the heralded guarantees
found within the New York Convention.208 Furthermore,
201. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
202. New York Convention, supra note 47, art. VI.
203. Brower, supra note 62, at 83; see also Schwartz, supra note 196, at 132 ("[T]he modem
trend, as reflected in the UNCITRAL Model Law, is to harmonize the two regimes .....
204. Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 37, at 1444.
205. Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2006) ("The court shall confirm the award unless it
finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified
in the [New York] Convention.").
206. "One of the surprising effects of the legislative reform movement has been to reinforce the
concept of the territorial application of arbitration law and the importance of the law of the seat of
the arbitration." Schwartz, supra note 196, at 130 (quoting W.L. Craig, Some Trends and
Developments in the Laws and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J.
1, 36, 57 (1995)).
207. See Carter v. Health Net of Cal., Inc., 374 F.3d 830, 838 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Spector v.
Torenberg, 852 F. Supp. 201, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v.
Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[A]wards may be vacated, see 9 U.S.C. § 10, or
modified, see id. § 11, in the limited circumstances where the arbitrator's award is in manifest
disregard of the terms of the agreement, or where the award is in 'manifest disregard of the law."'
(citation omitted)). But see Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffhungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d
1434 (11th Cir. 1998); Lander Company, Inc. v. MMP Investments Inc., 107 F.3d 476 (7th Cir.
1997); Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrain Chem. Corp., 656 F. Supp. 160, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). For a
thorough discussion on the history and applicability of the manifest disregard standard in reviewing
arbitral awards governed by the New York Convention, see BORN, supra note 60, at 810-13.
208. Brower, supra note 173, at 84 ("[T]he United States has already taken the position that
Chapter 11 proceedings do not arise out of commercial relationships and that the deferential legal
framework for commercial arbitration generally does not apply to Chapter II awards."). Moreover,
despite the guarantees in the New York Convention, scholars encourage judicial review as giving
"precedence to doing justice rather than to the principle of finality." Sarosh Zaiwalla, Challenging
Arbitral Awards: Finality is Good but Justice is Better, 20 J. INT'L ARB. 199, 204 (April 2003).
After all, "an order annulling an arbitral award is of an entirely different character from a decision of
non-recognition or a refusal to enforce an award." Schwartz, supra note 196, at 133 (further noting
that "[w]hen an award is annulled, it ceases to exist (at least in the place where made) and this, in
turn, generally permits the parties to commence a new arbitration").
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the governments of Canada and Mexico, having suffered the
imposition of liability in three Chapter 11 disputes, recently
contrived a more potent device for the restoration of national
sovereignty: de novo (or at least heightened) review of awards in
annulment proceedings conducted by municipal courts at the seat of
arbitration.20 9
4. An Illustration: Metalclad
A clear example of the problems inherent in NAFTA was made evident
in the review of the Metalclad award.2 10 Mexico received an adverse
judgment from a Chapter 11 tribunal in Canada.21 Thereafter, Mexico
brought annulment proceedings in the municipal courts of British
Columbia. 21 2  Similarly, Canada also submitted arguments, 2 3 asking the
court to review the award with greater scrutiny than was typical for arbitral
awards because of the public nature of the dispute and because the awards
did not merit judicial deference.21 4 Canada's argument went on to suggest
209. Brower, supra note 173, at 46.
210. See supra notes 148, 150 and accompanying text. Metalclad was the first case to interact
with "domestic control mechanisms, raising many questions of first impression." Coe, The
Mandate, supra note 45, at 217 n.6. Other illustrations of annulment proceedings under Chapter 11
claims include the SD Myers and the Feldman decisions. See generally Canada v. SD Myers, Inc.,
FC 38, FCJ No. 29, 13 January 2004; United Mexican States v. Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa, OJ No.
5070, 16(2) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 167, aft'd, 193 OAC 216, 248 DLR (4th) 443 (Ont. CA)
(2003) (concluding that "a high level of deference should be accorded to the Tribunal especially in
cases where the Applicant Mexico is in reality challenging a finding of facts").
Although each court applied the UNCITRAL Model Law, varying degrees of deference were
afforded the tribunal awards, as compared to the Metalclad decision. See Gus Van Harten, Judicial
Supervision of NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration: Public or Private Law?, 21 ARB. INT'L 493, 506-07
(2005) (concluding that "Canadian courts applied a mixture of public and private law principles in
order to conclude that Chapter 11 tribunals were entitled to a high degree of deference"). According
to David Gantz, "[g]iven that these reviews ... will likely occur in other courts in other countries in
the future, the desirability of a more consistent review mechanism is obvious, even if creating a
mutually agreeable one may be difficult." David A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment
Provisions: From NAFTA to the United States - Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT'L L.
REv. 679, 763 (2004).
211. See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (Aug. 30,
2000) (Award), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/mm-award-e.pdf.
212. See United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2000 BCSC 622 (B.C. Sup. Ct. May 2, 2001),
available at http://naftaclaims.com/disputes.mexicometalclad.htm.
213. See NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 1128.
214. Canada argued the award did not merit judicial deference because:
[T]he NAFTA architecture indicates that the awards of Chapter Eleven tribunals about
public measures are not supposed to be worthy of judicial deference and not supposed to
be protected by a high standard of review. Chapter Eleven Tribunals do not exhibit the
features of a specialised or expert administrative tribunal. Chapter Eleven Tribunals are
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that the court adopt a "pragmatic and functional" approach. While rejecting
an argument to view awards under Chapter 11 as investment awards rather
than commercial awards,21 5 the court did not strictly apply the International
Commercial Arbitration Act (ICAA), 216 which would have given the tribunal
a "'powerful presumption"' of acting within their jurisdiction. 2 7  To the
contrary, the court did not even mention this presumption, but rather
overturned the tribunal's award because Chapter 11 tribunals only have
jurisdiction to hear claims arising under rights within Chapter 11, and the
tribunal found a violation of a transparency provision in Chapter 18 of
NAFTA.21 8 However, because of the "notable omission" of the "'powerful
presumption"' in the court's analysis, and because the court noted that the
"'pragmatic and functional' standard of review may "'be of assistance in
applying' the ICAA," the court "seems to have opened the door to de novo
,,219review. Indeed, the court went on to label the tribunal's interpretation of
Article 102(1) to include transparency "incorrect[]" and determined that the
tribunal relied on invalid precedent. 2 0  The heightened standard of review
by municipal courts "impairs the development of the rule of law in
international economic relations. 221
currently appointed ad hoc and for single cases. There is no Chapter Eleven secretariat or
in-house specialists or other institutional hallmark of expertise or special authority. This
contrasts with the standing secretariat of the World Trade Organization supporting its
dispute settlement panels or the staff supporting permanent domestic administrative
tribunals.
In re Arbitration Pursuant to Chapter Eleven of NAFTA Between Metalclad Corp. & United
Mexican States, Outline of Argument of Intervenor Attorney General of Canada (Feb. 16, 2001),
25-27, 30 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 2001), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputesmexico-
metalclad.htm.
215. See Brower, supra note 173, at 69 (arguing that differentiating between commercial and
noncommercial is "impossible, or at least highly subjective," and "[t]herefore, the proper inquiry
should focus on the evident intent of the NAFTA Parties to subject Chapter 11 proceedings to the
deferential legal framework of international commercial arbitration").
216. The International Commercial Arbitration Act is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law for
International Commercial Arbitration and provides the applicable domestic standards for review of
international commercial arbitration awards. See R. Doak Bishop & William W. Russell, Survey of
Arbitration Awards Under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 19 J. INT'L
ARB. 505, 574 (2002).
217. Brower, supra note 173, at 63.
218. The court had, but rejected, the option of reading the transparency into the minimum standard
of treatment requirements pursuant to Article 1105. Id. at 67.
219. Id. at 66 (quoting United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., (2001) 89 B.C.L.R.3d 359
54). Furthermore, the court "rejected in theory - but accepted in practice - the judicial role
advocated by Canada and Mexico." Id. at 47, 66 (citing Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice
Tysoe, United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp. 54 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 2001)).
220. Metalclad Corp., (2001) 89 B.C.L.R.3d 71. Furthermore, "[t]he Tribunal did not simply
interpret Article 1105 to include a minimum standard of transparency. No authority was cited or
evidence introduced to establish that transparency has become part of customary international law."
Id. 68. The Tribunal also reasoned that the transparency provision was incorporated in the
provisions of Chapter 18 but not into Chapter II and therefore, not all of the principles and rules in
Article 102(1) should be read into every chapter of NAFTA. Id. 71.
221. Brower, supra note 173, at 47.
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The court also gave a cursory overview of the annulment grounds
provided for in ICSID Article 52(1), but immediately rejected those grounds
because they are only binding under the ICSID Convention and not the
ICSID Additional Facilities.222  The court then went on to analyze
annulment according to domestic legislation.223 In sum, Canada used its
courts to advance its own interests by expanding review at the expense of
legitimacy of the Chapter 11 dispute resolution mechanism, 224 and "[t]he
practical lesson to be learned from Metalclad is that courts at the place of
arbitration will have the last word in an arbitration ....,225
Through this ad hoc and varied approach to review, tribunal decisions
will not receive the finality necessary to foster economic growth but will
lead to unworkable, incoherent results. 226  Accordingly, the NAFTA
appellate review system is in need of refinement to maintain the coherency,
reliability, and predictability necessary to foster foreign investments and
economic growth.227
B. CAFTA Reforms: Proficiency or Prolixity?
CAFTA provisions allow for a greater variety of appellate reform. For
instance, while NAFTA allows dispute settlement under ICSID,228 it cannot
222. Metalclad Corp., (2001) 89 B.C.L.R.3d 125-26.
223. Id. 126.
224. Howard Mann, NAFTA's Investment Chapter: Dynamic Laboratory, Failed Experiments,
and Lessons for the FTAA, 97 AM. SOCY INT'L L. PROC. 247, 254 (2003).
225. Alvarez & Park, supra note 10, at 376; see also Franck, supra note 36, at 1556 (noting that
"the ultimate outcome of the award was in part dictated by the application of domestic Canadian
arbitration law"); Brower, supra note 173, at 72 ("[O]bservers have long discredited the notion that
states may invoke domestic laws and policies to disown their arbitration agreements.").
226. Municipal courts cannot remedy "the uncoordinated commitment of creative lawmaking to a
series of ad hoc tribunals creat[ing] a considerable likelihood of incoherent results." Brower, supra
note 62, at 66-67. Specifically regarding NAFTA's "fair and equitable treatment" clause, NAFTA
Article 1105, one scholar has noted, "[g]iven the[] high stakes, the inability of ad hoc tribunals to
establish a uniform understanding of Article 1105(1) deals a serious blow to coherence and
predictability, the necessary foundation . . . for NAFTA's investment chapter." Id. at 68.
Furthermore, this provision "unhappily juxtaposes the NAFTA Parties' roles as litigants and as states
parties" thus "encourag[ing] the courts of the NAFTA Parties to violate the most fundamental tenet
of procedural justice common to international law, Chapter 11, and the pertinent rules of
arbitration." Id. at 77 (citing John P. Gaffney, Due Process in the World Trade Organization: The
Need for Procedural Justice in the Dispute Settlement System, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1173, 1179,
1195 (1999)).
227. See Brower, supra note 173, at 86 (noting that the current annulment process "threatens to
diminish investor confidence by preventing the speedy resolution of disputes with host states" and
"cripple[s] a system of neutral adjudication designed to promote the flow of capital across the
borders of NAFTA Parties").
228. See NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 1120.1(a).
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be invoked because neither Mexico nor Canada is a signatory to the ICSID
Convention.229 However, all the countries who are signatories to CAFTA
are also signatories to the ICSID Convention.23  Thus, the ICSID
Convention will inevitably govern many of the disputes, and parties may
avail themselves of ICSID's internal and exclusive' annulment procedure.
Because of the likelihood of disputes proceeding under ICSID, an overview
of its procedures, as distinct from the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, is in
order. Furthermore, CAFTA forges new ground in post-award review by
implementing advanced procedures for parties to comment on awards and by
laying the groundwork for an appellate body.23
Before discussing the ramifications of annulment procedures and the
effects of an appellate body, it is important to recognize the distinctions
between an annulment and an appeal. An annulment results in the
"invalidation of the original decision," whereas a successful appeal results in
a modification. 32 Furthermore, annulment addresses the legitimacy of the
proceedings and not whether the tribunal applied the law correctly.233
However, an appeal can modify or overturn an award based on procedural
legitimacy concerns as well as errors in applying substantive law. 3 The
following section discusses annulment procedures within ICSID followed by
an overview of the appellate procedures unique to CAFTA.
1. Annulment Under the ICSID Convention
235
The main difference between proceeding under the ICSID Convention
and proceeding under the ICSID Additional Facilities is that under the
ICSID Convention all contracting states are required to recognize and
enforce an ICSID award.2 36 These awards are not subject to the vagaries of
229. "For a dispute to be within the jurisdiction of the Centre one of the parties must be a
Contracting State ... and the other party must be a 'national of another Contracting State."' INT'L
BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON THE CONVENTION
ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES & NATIONAL OF OTHER STATES
44(1965).
230. While Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras have signed and
ratified the ICSID Convention, the Dominican Republic has yet to ratify. See The World Bank
Group: ICSID, List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention,
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/constate/c-states-en.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2006).
231. See CAFTA, supra note 12, arts. 10.20(9), 10.20(10).
232. CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 891 (2001).
233. Id. at 892.
234. Id.
235. It is important to remember that the parties to a dispute may (required for cases involving the
Dominican Republic) still elect to proceed under the ICSID Additional Facilities or UNCITRAL,
which will result in the same difficulties discussed supra at notes 192-209 and accompanying text.
236. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States art. 53, Mar. 18, 1956, 17 U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. Indeed, "[u]pon
ratification of the ICSID Convention by Mexico and Canada, a number of the problems associated
with domestic court review of Chapter II awards would evaporate." Coe, Taking Stock, supra note
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municipal court annulment and enforcement procedures. 237  A disputing
party has 120 days to challenge an award through the Article 52 annulment
mechanism. 238  Upon challenging the validity of the award, the Secretary-
General of ICSID convenes an ad hoc committee that will annul an award if
there is a manifest excess of power, a corrupt arbitrator, a serious departure
from a fundamental rule of procedure,239 or a failure to state the reasons on
which an award is based. 240 Stated explicitly in case law 2 4 1 and implicitly in
the ICSID Convention,242 the annulment procedure is not a review for errors
of fact or law. However, annulment committees are prone to look into the
merits of the dispute when evaluating two particular grounds of annulment:
whether "the Tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers" 243 and whether "the
award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.",244 These grounds
are addressed in turn.
The annulment committees will vacate an award if "the Tribunal
manifestly exceeded its powers., 245  The scope of "manifestly" remains
37, at 1450.
237. See supra notes 199-209 and accompanying text (discussing problems with annulment
proceedings at the situs). "Under the Convention, Art. 52 is the only way of having the award set
aside. In particular, domestic courts have no power of review over ICSID awards." SCHREUER,
supra note 232, at 889; see also Coe, Achilles Heel, supra note 104, at 195 n.72 ("In a treaty-based
system to some extent designed to circumvent local courts, it seems incongruous that those planning
to arbitrate should be required to sift through and weigh such indigenous idiosyncracies.").
238. ICSID Convention, supra note 236, art. 52(2).
239. The Kldckner annulment committee held that "any sign of partiality[] must be considered to
constitute, within the meaning of Article 52(1)(d), a 'serious departure from a fundamental rule of
procedure."' SCHREUER, supra note 232, at 973 (quoting Kl6ckner v. Cameroon, Decision on
Annulment, May 3, 1985, 2 ICSID Reports 130). In addition, "violation of the right to be heard,
absence or abuse of deliberation among the arbitrators and violation of the rules of evidence" have
been argued to constitute serious departures from fundamental rules of procedure. See id.
240. ICSID Convention, supra note 236, art. 52(1); see SCHREUER, supra note 232, at 928-1008.
241. See MINE v. Guinea, Decision on Annulment, December 22, 1989, 4 ICSID Reports 85
("Annulment is not a remedy against an incorrect decision."); Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on
Annulment, May 16, 1986, 1 ICSID Reports 520; K16ckner v. Cameroon, Decision on Annulment,
May 3, 1985, 2 ICSID Reports 97.
242. An "award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any
other remedy except those provided for in this convention." ICSID Convention, supra note 236, art.
53.
243. ICSID Convention, supra note 236, art. 52(1)(b); SCHREUER, supra note 232, at 935 (noting
that in two cases "the ad hoc Committee went beyond a prima facie examination and undertook a
fairly extensive substantive analysis").
244. ICSID Convention, supra note 236, art. 52(t)(e); SCHREUER, supra note 232, at 989-90
("The formal test of the presence of a statement of reasons blends into a substantive test of adequacy
and correctness and the distinction between annulment and appeal [] becomes blurred." (citation
omitted)).
245. ICSID Convention, supra note 236, art. 52(1)(b).
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elusive as committees have yet to articulate relevant factors.246 Several
committees have concluded that as long as a tribunal's decision is tenable or
non-arbitrary, the tribunal has not "manifestly exceeded its powers.
' 247
However, other committees have expanded the scope of scrutiny. For
example, one committee considered a failure to apply the proper substantive
law 248 as an excess of a tribunal's powers. 249 Other committees have taken
this principle a step further by holding that a failure to apply even a part of
the proper substantive law constitutes an excess of powers and is grounds for
annulment.25 ° Committees have also held that implicit in reviewing whether
a tribunal exceeded its powers is the authority to review whether the tribunal
had jurisdiction. 25' Furthermore, tribunals are not allowed to rule ex aequo
et bono without the disputing parties permission; to do so has been held to
be a violation in excess of the tribunal's powers.252 Given the broad
discretion and myriad of ways an annulment committee may review awards
under the manifest excess of powers provision, the annulment process
246. SCHREUER, supra note 232, at 933.
247. Id. at 934 (citing Klockner v. Cameroon, Decision on Annulment, May 3, 1985, 2 ICSID
Reports 98 & Bjom Pirrwitz, Annulment of Arbitral Awards Under Article 52 of the Washington
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States,
23 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 73, 96, 104 (1988)).
248. The proper substantive law may include international law as well as domestic law agreed
upon by the parties. Id. at 962-66.
249. Id. "Application of a law other than that agreed to by the parties constitutes an excess of
powers and is a valid ground for annulment. An error in the application of the proper law, even if it
leads to a manifestly incorrect application of the law, is not a ground for annulment." Id. at 935,
944; Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Annulment, May 16, 1986, 1 ICSID Reports 515 (taking it for
granted that failure to apply proper substantive law was a violation in excess of power).
250. SCHREUIER, supra note 232, at 948.
Despite their self-professed refusal to examine the substantive correctness of the Awards
before them, the Klockner I and Amco I Committees did not restrict themselves to
establishing whether the Tribunals had identified the applicable law correctly. Rather,
they also looked at the question of how this law had been applied.
Id. The tribunal to whom the case was resubmitted later commented that the excess of powers was
"evidenced by a perceived failure to apply the applicable law, by virtue of its having been applied in
a manner that reaches a conclusion believed untenable by the ad hoc Committee." Amco v.
Indonesia, Resubmitted Case: Decision on Jurisdiction, May 10, 1988, 1 ICSID Reports 559. This
has led scholars to posit, "a distinction between non-application and erroneous application becomes
impossible." SCHREUER, supra note 232, at 950 (citations omitted). Still others have expressed
concern that "Amco illustrates the danger to legitimacy posed by a control mechanism exceeding the
bounds of its authority and thereby threatening the viability of the carefully calibrated ICSID
Convention system of arbitration." BJORKLUND, supra note 168, at 471,509.
251. SCHREUER, supra note 232, at 936-37 ("Clearly, an arbitral tribunal's lack of jurisdiction,
whether said to be partial or total, necessarily comes within the scope of an 'excess of powers' under
Article 52(1)(b)." (quoting K18ckner v. Cameroon, Decision on Annulment, May 3, 1985, 2 ICSID
Reports 98)).
252. SCHREUER, supra note 232, at 957 (citing Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Annulment, May
16, 1986, 1 ICSID Reports 119; MINE v. Guinea, Decision on Annulment, December 22, 1989, 4
ICSID Reports 87; & Klockner v. Cameroon, Decision on Annulment, May 3, 1985, 2 ICSID
Reports 124).
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appears to be creeping into a substantive review, rather than a limited
review, for manifest excesses of power.253
The second ground for annulment under Article 52 of the ICSID
Convention is for a tribunal's failure to state the reasons upon which its
award is based.254 "Of all the grounds for annulment, an evaluation of the
tribunal's reasoning is most likely to blend into an examination of the
award's substantive correctness and hence to cross the border between
annulment and appeal., 255  A tribunal's failure to give reasons 256 for a
decision is most likely to occur for only a portion of an award rather than a
complete absence of reasoning for an award in its totality.257 The extent to
which this reasoning needs to be "pertinent and capable of supporting the
results reached by the tribunal" remains unclear and amounts to a
considerable grant of discretion to the annulment committee.258
There are multiple factors which render this provision particularly
susceptible to abuse. First, different legal cultures will have different
notions of what constitutes acceptable reasoning. 25 9 Additionally, the need
to forge alliances and make compromises may result in qualified language
that does not afford a transparent view of a direct line of reasoning. 260
Furthermore, the standard for language in a decision to constitute a "reason"
is whether the explanation is "sufficiently relevant" or "reasonably
acceptable."26' This standard is nothing more than a slippery slope to
substantive review as evidenced by the committee's application of the
standard.262 For example, one committee overturned a tribunal's award
253. SCHREUER, supra note 232, at 935.
254. See supra note 244.
255. SCHREUER, supra note 232, at 986 (noting that this provision "was invoked in every
application for annulment" and that "it is the one that may be relied upon most easily") (citations
omitted).
256. Proffering contradictory reasons is considered a failure to reason at all. Id. at 994-97.
257. Id. at 987, 989 ("If the decision appears incorrect or inexplicable, the ad hoc committee will
be more inclined to view the absence of reasons as a ground for annulment."). Furthermore, "[tihe
ad hoc committees were agreed that a failure to deal with every question could lead to annulment,..
• [b]ut they were less clear as to whether the appropriate ground would always be a failure to state
reasons under Art. 52(l)(e)." Id. at 1001. The ad hoc committee in Ki6ckner I "did not believe that
every single argument needs to be dealt with," but that every question, "in the sense that it could
have affected the outcome of the Award," should be addressed. Id. at 1003-04.
258. Id. at 986.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See id. at 990, 992 (quoting Kl6ckner v. Cameroon, Decision on Annulment, May 3, 1985, 2
ICSID Reports 143 & Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Annulment, May 16, 1986, 1 ICSID Reports
520/1).
262. Id. at 991.
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because the conclusions "d[id] not necessarily follow . . . [and] should have
been expressly justified. 2 63 However, another committee, in an unrelated
dispute, chose to adopt a more lenient standard, requiring only that an award
"must enable the reader to follow the reasoning of the Tribunal on points of
fact and law. . . even if it made an error of fact or of law.',264 The only thing
clear about the standard of review to determine whether an award is
reasoned is that there is no clear standard, and the level of review depends
on the subjective views of the committee member reviewing the award.
Looking ahead, "adopting clearer rules .. .cannot ...represent[] a
complete solution to the legitimacy crisis. ' 265  Even though CAFTA
annulment standards will attain a greater level of uniformity governed by
ICSID, these uniform provisions will remain ambiguous, possibly resulting
in substantive review and unnecessary delay in finalizing arbitral awards.266
Due to the particular problems with the wording of two of the ICSID
provisions, 267 disputing parties under NAFTA and CAFTA would be better
served by annulment procedures if limited to the New York Convention
Article V(1)(a)-(d) grounds,268 with an express limitation that the review
should not be substantive. That is, the review should not correct errors of
fact or law. Creating a uniform and limited review process for annulments is
critical to maintain a reliable yet efficient dispute resolution system.269 This
would prevent the unadvised alternative-courts reviewing the legitimacy of
a foreign court's decision-which raises "vexatious questions" and runs
contrary to the principle of comity.
70
Utilizing these limited grounds for enforcement as well as for annulment
will not obviate the need for Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention-
giving states where the award is enforced the option to refuse enforcement if
it "has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country
in which, or under the law of which, that award was made"--because each
state will still subjectively interpret the scope of the grounds set forth in
subsections (a)-(d).2 71 Therefore, states will continue to have the capacity to
263. Id. (quoting Kl6ckner v. Cameroon, Decision on Annulment, May 3, 1985, 2 ICSID Reports
159).
264. Id. at 993 (quoting MINE v. Guinea, Decision on Annulment, December 22, 1989, 4 ICSID
Reports 88).
265. Brower, supra note 62, at 88.
266. See supra notes 235-64 and accompanying text (discussing the problems inherent in the
ICSID annulment procedures).
267. See supra notes 245-64 and accompanying text (discussing specifically ICSID Convention
Arts. 52(l)(b), (e)).
268. Jan Paulsson, Rediscovering the N.Y. Convention: Further Reflections on Chromalloy, 12
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 12, 29 (1997).
269. Coe, supra note 177, at 946 ("Whether one blames a general indeterminacy in rules of
decision or the variant proclivities of arbitrators, unfortunate results flow from disarray in the
jurisprudence applicable to host state undertakings, at least in extreme cases of disunity.").
270. Paulsson, supra note 268, at 29.
271. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 5, June 10,
1124
[Vol. 34: 1085, 2007] Wild West to World Order
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
perform their primary role of protecting property within their boundaries.
272
Furthermore, based on the principle of comity,273 other states may decide to
give deference to the host-state's interpretation even though that court may
disagree with the outcome.
2. Appellate Review
The review mechanisms new to CAFTA are found in two provisions
within Article 20: Sections 9 and 10. While both NAFTA and CAFTA
permit a tribunal to revise an award to make it more robust,2 74 Section 9 of
CAFTA provides that at the request of one of the parties, the tribunal shall
submit to the parties the prospective award for comment. 275 The parties will
then have sixty days to submit comments regarding the award, and the
tribunal will have no more than forty-five days to issue the award after the
comment period.276 A tribunal is more likely to be accommodating to the
parties' critiques of an award before it has been officially issued, and the
parties will be less likely to challenge an award that they had a hand in
shaping. In that respect, Section 9 of CAFTA provides a more robust review
process, 27 7 but limits this robust review to disputes where there is no
recourse to an appellate body.278
Section 10 of CAFTA proposes an international appellate body to
review arbitral awards and to create binding precedent and uniform
interpretations. 279 This was proposed primarily because of the decentralized
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 2520; Charles N. Brower, Charles H. Brower, II & Jeremy K. Sharpe, The
Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudication System, 19 ARB. INT'L 415, 438 (2003) (observing that
"even if every state were to adopt the Model Law verbatim, it is virtually inevitable that different
national judiciaries will produce diverging interpretations of the same instrument").
272. See LOCKE, supra note 13, § 124 ("The great and chief end therefore, of men's uniting into
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property.").
273. The notion of comity must also be combined with deference given a particular nation, not out
of mutual respect, but because of a unique political relationship.
274. See NAFTA, supra note It, art 1135.3; see also CAFTA, supra note 12, art 10.26(6).
275. CAFTA, supra note 12, art. 10.20(9)(a).
276. Id. Parties may be familiar with this process because the ICSID Additional Facility Rules
allow a party to request the Secretary-General to obtain a clarification from the Tribunal within
forty-five days after an award has been issued. Facility Rules, supra note 109, art. 56.
277. It should be noted that the scope of a party's critique remains unclear. The scope of critique
may be especially important if a party discovers new facts or arguments.
278. CAFTA, supra note 12, art. 10.20(9)(b).
279. CAFTA, supra note 12, art. 10.20(10). NAFTA neither implements nor contemplates an
appellate procedure.
[W]ith the discretion granted to tribunals, the growing volume of disputes, and their
importance to ever broader constituencies, the use of ad hoc tribunals without
coordinating mechanisms seems likely to provoke crisis. Therefore, without foreclosing
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and incongruous NAFTA system, which "allows only episodic substantive
review, made less effective by the lack of formal authorization and the
associated artificiality that may, therefore, accompany the exercise. '28 °
Weighing the conflicting interests of finality and coherency, the
governments determined "unpredictability is too costly to be tolerated,
costly not only in terms of resources but also in terms of public confidence
and a heightened potential for backlash against arbitration.,
281
Unfortunately, the parties to CAFTA could not agree on an appropriate
appellate mechanism and only committed to discussing the creation of an
appellate body within three months of the date of entry into force.2t 2
A free-standing appellate body would have several positive effects on
the dispute resolution process. As opposed to participating in an annulment
or enforcement proceeding in a foreign state where one may speculate
the consideration of alternatives, one should praise the new wave of treaties that
contemplate the establishment of appellate bodies for investor-state arbitration.
Brower, supra note 19, at 923 (citing U.S. Model BIT art. 28(10); Frederick M. Abbott, The
Political Economy of NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Equality Before the Law and the Boundaries of North
American Integration, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 303, 308 (2000) and William S. Dodge,
International Decisions: Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 910, 918 (2001)).
280. Coe, Achilles Heel, supra note 104, at 206; see also Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority
Act of 2002 § 2102(b), 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b) (2004) (including as a trade negotiating objective:
"providing for an appellate body or similar mechanism to provide coherence to the interpretations of
investment provisions in trade agreements").
For a further illustration of the need for a final appellate judgment, one only needs to look to
the procedural history of the claims arising out of a dispute between the Czech Republic and a Dutch
company, CME Media Enterprises. See BJORKLUND, supra note 168, at 486-99. In this case, a
corporation was afforded the opportunity to take "multiple bites at the apple." Id. at 510 (quotations
omitted). "CME is a primer on the potential for arbitration run amok, so to speak - not in terms of
overly intrusive review by the relevant control mechanisms, but with respect to the ability on the part
of the parties simultaneously to litigate overlapping claims in different for a and on technically
different legal theories." Id. at 509. Indeed, "[t]he ability to pursue relief in multiple for a can create
a perception of systemic dysfunction." Id. at 510. Because contradictory decisions were reached in
parallel proceedings, "CME threatens the legitimacy of investor-State arbitration on a larger scale; its
effects are not confined to one mechanism for resolving disputes, but could bring into disrepute the
whole system of BIT arbitration, regardless which regime - whether ICSID or UNCITRAL, or
something else besides - governs the cases." Id. at 509.
281. Coe, supra note 177, at 951. "Although the prospect of a second instance would necessarily
affect investors' expectations of finality, the countervailing benefits to legitimacy would be
substantial and the consequences would be less deleterious than current fears of heightened review
by municipal courts." Brower, supra note 62, at 92. The author continues by asserting that "the
sources of illegitimacy seem obvious." Id. at 93. They include: treaty provisions' lack of
"substantial measure of textural clarity;" ad hoc tribunals' tendency to create "incoherent doctrine on
a key provision;" ad hoc tribunals' lack of "pedigree accepted as valid by the governed community
and may seem prone to depart from ritual due to inexperience;" and ad hoc tribunals' tendency to be
"relatively less accountable, transparent, and accessible to democratic processes than permanent
tribunals." Id.; Franck, supra note 36, at 1622 ("The slight cost of sacrificing some degree of
finality to create a temporal window for the appellate process is ultimately preferable to a dispute
resolution system that renders incoherent decisions and adversely affects the expectations of
investors and Sovereigns.").
282. CAFTA, supra note 12, art. 10.20(10), Annex 10-F; see also David A. Gantz, The Evolution
of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the United States - Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 679 (2004).
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"about what nuanced pressures have infected the process,' 283 an appellate
system affords a neutral forum to host these proceedings. Indeed, an
appellate system that appoints arbitrators from non-party nations would
escape even the appearance of bias or partiality.284 For example, parties will
not risk biased domestic laws or interpretations favoring the host state or
party if the appellate procedures are based on international standards.285 In
addition, a party would no longer need to worry about a host state or party
having greater familiarity with the intricacies and nuances of the law or
judge governing the case.286 An appellate system based on international
standards would also have the peripheral benefit of being able to retain the
same counsel throughout the entire proceedings rather than obtaining local
counsel during the enforcement or annulment proceedings. 287  Finally, an
appellate body would provide coherency to the application of substantive
law and provide centralized standards for annulment, both of which are
markedly lacking in the current framework. 288 "[T]he increased legitimacy
that is gained by having a supervising body cannot be overlooked
or underestimated.,
289
Despite the perceived benefits, significant concerns continue to plague
the formation of an appellate body; as they remain unresolved, each is
briefly reviewed.290  To begin, the nature and composition of an appellate
body remains undecided.291 Much like the International Court of Justice,292
283. Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 37, at 1446 (concluding further that "[a]t a minimum,
appearances suffer").
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1447.
287. Id.; Brower, supra note 62, at 92.
288. Subsequent treaties may be necessary to avoid annulment proceedings under the ICSID
Convention, and unless the parties agreed, the award would still be subject to domestic court review
under the grounds specified in the New York Convention. Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 37, at 1447
n.303. After all, "the stakes in investment arbitration are simply too great to sit by idly while issues
of public international law are being decided inconsistently, in private." Franck, supra note 36, at
1613.
289. Franck, supra note 36, at 1624; see also BJORKLUND, supra note 168, at 513 ("Perhaps the
most significant benefit accompanying the establishment of a tribunal is the likely enhancement of
the integrity and legitimacy of investor-State arbitration.").
290. Franck, supra note 36, at 1607 ("The precise form and mandate of an appellate body leaves
room for a considerable amount of debate.").
291. See CAFTA, supra note 12, Annex 10-F § (1)(a).
292. The International Court of Justice is located in the Hague, Netherlands and handles state-to-
state disputes. International Court of Justice, The Court at a Glance, http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icjgnnot.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2006). There are fifteen
judges who serve nine-year terms on the court. Id. The judges are nominated by their respective
countries and elected by the UN General Assembly and Security Council. Id. Each permanent
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each state2 93 that agrees to participate and be bound by the permanent
294
appellate body should nominate... one appellate member to sit on three-
member panels. Furthermore, each appellate member should be assigned to
cases randomly, provided they are not of the same nationality as one of the
296 frdisputing parties. If at first not enough states are members of the
appellate body, each country should nominate two appellate members.2 97 It
may also be useful to link this appellate body with an established institution
that can handle the administrative details, like the Permanent Court of
International Arbitration in The Hague298 or the ICSID Convention. 99
Another concern is the relationship between an appellate body and the
arbitral rules.300 Because of the expense and delay of finality, appellate
review should not be guaranteed, but a party may submit a request for
appellate review within thirty days of the tribunal's issuing an award. 0 An
appellate member designated to handle such requests should decide whether
to accept review of a party's dispute. If the submission is accepted for
appellate review, the appellate body should be responsible for notifying both
disputing parties. The appellate proceedings should then pre-empt
annulment proceedings within ICSID or in the municipal courts in the
member of the Security Council has a representative on the court. Id.
293. Franck, supra note 36, at 1619 ("Given the overwhelming similarity of the rights
promulgated in investment treaties, it is vital to make a comprehensive effort to harmonize and
clarify the development of these standards."). Accordingly, signatory states should not be limited to
those who are members to a particular multi-lateral or bilateral investment treaty. The appellate
process "promotes clarity throughout the network and permits the articulation of a reliable body of
international economic and public international law. Such uniformity promotes the confidence of
the investment arbitration system." Id.
294. Id. at 1609 (positing that "a series of ad hoc appellate tribunals could come to inconsistent
decisions about an existing inconsistent decision, this exacerbates the challenge of creating a
coherent jurisprudence").
295. Nomination of members will lead to the most qualified individuals sitting on the review
panel. These individuals will likely possess specific expertise in investor-state arbitration.
296. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
297. That way appellate members will not be overwhelmed by the number of cases and will be
able to adequately address the pertinent legal issues before them.
298. Franck, supra note 36, at 1623 (citing Judge Howard M. Holtzmann, A Task for the 21st
Century: Creating a New International Court for Resolving Disputes on the Enforceability of
Arbitral Awards, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE LCIA
CENTENARY CONFERENCE 109 (Martin Hunter et al. eds., 1995)).
299. BJORKLUND, supra note 168, at 511 ("Establishing such a mechanism under the auspices of
ICSID would be ideal. ICSID has the institutional expertise; highly intelligent, experienced, and
competent staff; and the facilities to house such an [sic] body."). ICSID has proposed the addition
of an appellate body within its framework. See ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of
the Framework for ICSID Arbitration 6 (Oct. 22, 2004) (working paper available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/improve-arb.pdf).
300. CAFTA, supra note 12, Annex 10-F § (l)(e).
301. Franck, supra note 36, at 1622 ("[A] thirty day limitation would ensure that decisions to
appeal are made quickly and there is a degree of finality.").
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situs.30 2 This will avoid double review, which will inevitably lead to
contradictory determinations.
In addition, the appellate body's scope and standard of review remains
an issue.3 °3 First, the scope must be limited to mistakes of law and not
mistakes of fact.304 Allowing a de novo review would result in a clogged
and inefficient system. Furthermore, reviewing "only . . . the interpretation
of law .. .related to both jurisdiction and the merits . ..will enhance
certainty about what rights investors have and for what conduct Sovereigns
are liable. 3 °5 Second, the appellate body should apply a de novo standard
of review to legal interpretations. This is appropriate because due deference
is extended to tribunals by limiting the scope of review to legal issues.
Because the function of an appellate body is to create a coherent, reliable,
and predictable body of law, the legal issues reviewed must be
reviewed rigorously.
Yet another concern with the establishment of an appellate body is
whether an appellate decision affirming an arbitral award remains subject to
enforcement review procedures in domestic laws.3 6 In the interests of
finality and coherency, this potential problem can be avoided provided the
signatory states agree to accept the appellate body decisions as binding,
similar to the binding force provided for tribunal awards in Article 54 of the
ICSID Convention.30 7 Implicit in the authority to issue a binding award is
the appellate body's power to uphold an award or to affirm the award for
different reasons.308 Furthermore, if the appellate body's decision yields
302. See BJORKLUND, supra note 168, at 511 (stating that "one could speculate that annulment
would soon enough whither away, particularly if an appellate mechanism were included in... large
multilateral treat[ies]"); see also supra at notes 200-14 and accompanying text (discussing the
problems associated with a party seeking annulment in its own courts as illustrated by the Metalclad
case).
303. CAFTA, supra note 12, Annex 10-F § (1)(b).
304. Franck, supra note 36, at 1607 (opining that "an appellate body could focus on establishing a
clear and coherent body of law and 'correcting legal errors in specific cases'; meanwhile arbitral
tribunals can use their expertise and focus on their own institutional competency: developing a
factual record, clarifying issues in dispute, and applying legal principles") (citation omitted).
305. Id. at 1620.
306. CAFTA, supra note 12, Annex 10-F § (1)(f).
307. ICSID Convention, supra note 236, art. 54 ("Each Contracting State shall recognize an award
rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by
that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State."). Furthermore,
while "[i]t is possible that States will give their consent to the appellate body by including the ICSID
Convention's provision on automatic enforcement of awards; ... even that safeguard has not
completely insulated ICSID awards from national court review." BJORKLUND, supra note 168, at
520; see also Brower, supra note 62, at 92.
308. CAFTA, supra note 12, Annex 10-F § (1)(d). An appellate body "must have a mandate not
only to decide the appeal but also have the power to effectuate its determinations." Franck, supra
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only a de minimus modification of an award, the modifications should be
incorporated into the award, and it should be given binding effect. This will
be both economically efficient and non-prejudicial. However, if the
appellate body overturns the award, the case should be remanded to the
previously instituted tribunal 30 9 to re-hear the case in accordance with the
legal reasoning propounded by the appellate body. With the modifications
suggested in this section,310 it is hoped that, if not CAFTA, then future free
trade agreements will create "a predictable legal framework for
investors." 3 '
V. CONCLUSION
As far back as 2002, Congress passed a bill stating that their "principal
trade negotiation objectives" for foreign investment included "providing for
an appellate body" and "ensuring the fullest measure of transparency in the
dispute settlement mechanism. ' 311 CAFTA is much more than a prolix
revision of NAFTA; the skilled negotiators instilled principal democratic
ideals in an otherwise shrouded enterprise. While the revised transparency
provisions may grant only a short reprieve from harsh public critiques, the
number of investor-state disputes will continue to rise,3 13 and the creation of
an appellate body will eventually be necessary to breathe coherency and
legitimacy into the Chapter 10 and 11 investor-state dispute resolution
mechanisms. 3
14
But revolutionary changes do not happen overnight, and while CAFTA
represents a significant step in the evolutionary process, the fate of
international dispute settlement remains contingent on further advances fully
note 36, at 1621.
309. Franck, supra note 36, at 1621 ("The original tribunal already has an intimate familiarity
with the parties, the facts, and the issues that other entities lack. In contrast, establishing a new
tribunal and initiating an entirely new set of proceedings would be a waste of resources and create
unnecessary delay.").
310. CAFTA, supra note 12, Annex 10-F § (1)(c). This section provides that the Negotiating
Group should discuss the transparency of the proceedings in a proposed appellate body. Id. It seems
only natural to extend the same level of transparency and confidentiality to the proceedings that are
provided for in the tribunal's procedures. See supra Part III.
311. Press Release, United States Trade Representative, U.S. & Central American Countries
Conclude Historic Free Trade Agreement (Dec. 17, 2003), http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/
PressReleases/2003/December/USCentral:American:CountriesConcludeHistoricFreeTrade_
Agreement.html; see also Franck, supra note 36, at 1607 (concluding that "an appellate body could
restore faith in the system, promote consistency, provide predictability, and reduce the risk of
inconsistent decisions to make the system sustainable and legitimate in the long term").
312. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3802(b)(2)(G)(iv), (H)
(2004).
313. Coe, supra note 178, at 956 (noting that "neither new investments nor new claim filings are
likely to abate anytime soon").
314. BJORKLUND, supra note 168, at 515 ("However, it is important that the establishment of an
appellate body not be seen as a panacea for all ills.").
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incorporating Locke's theories.315 Suffice it to say, the days of wild-west,
gunboat diplomacy are over and a world order is slowly emerging for the
peaceful resolution of international commercial disputes.
315. LOCKE, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
1131
APPENDIX A:
DISTINGUISHING INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN
NAFTA AND CAFTA
NAFTA CHAPTER 11 CAFTA CHAPTER 10
Consultation and Negotiation
"The disputing parties should first "Consultation or negotiation"
attempt to settle a claim through becomes "consultation and
consultation or negotiation." negotiation." Examples of
(Art. 1118). consultation and negotiation are
included: "non-binding, third-party
procedures such as conciliation and
mediation." (Art. 10.15).
Submission of a Claim to Arbitration
An investor with standing may
bring a claim pursuant to Article
1502(3)(a) and 1503(2), which are
State Enterprise and Monopoly
provisions. (Arts. 1116(1) &
1117(1)).
Notice of Intent for enterprises
requires name and address of
enterprise. (Art. 1119(a)).
A claim is submitted when "the
notice of arbitration given under
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
is received by the disputing
party." (Art. 1137(1)).
Rather than bringing a claim under
Enterprise and Monopoly
provisions, an investor may bring a
claim for a breach of an investor
agreement or authorization.
(Art. 10.16.1).
Notice of Intent for enterprises
requires the name, address and
place of incorporation of the
enterprise. (Art. 10.16.2(a)).
A claim is submitted when the
notice of arbitration "referred to in
Article 3 of the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, together with the
statement of claim referred to in
Article 18 of the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, are received by
the respondent" and shall be
deemed submitted on the date of
receipt. (Art. 10.16.4.(c)).
New to CAFTA:
Allows for submission of claims
under the ICSID Rules of
Procedures for Arbitration
Proceedings. (Art. 10.16.3(a)).
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The notice of arbitration must also
include the name of the arbitrator
the claimant wishes to appoint or a
consent letter allowing the
Secretary-General to appoint an
arbitrator. (Art. 10.16.6).
Conditions and Limitations on Consent of Each Party
Three year statute of limitations
beginning to run "from the date on
which the investor first acquired,
or should have first acquired,
knowledge of the alleged breach
and knowledge that the investor
has incurred loss or damage."
(Art. 1116(2)) (emphasis added).
Requires parties to waive their
right to bring a claim in front of an
administrative tribunal under the
laws of a Party except for non-
monetary relief (Art. 1121 (1)(b)),
or if the disputing Party "deprived
a disputing investor of control of
an enterprise." (Art. 1121(4)).
Three year statute of limitation
begins to run from the date the
investor first acquired, or should
have first acquired, knowledge of
the breach under Section 16(1)
and knowledge that the claimant or
the enterprise incurred loss or
damage.
(Art. 10.18.1) (emphasis added).
Exempts only non-monetary
interim injunctive relief and further
requires that the relief must be "for
the sole purpose of preserving the
claimant's or the enterprise's rights
and interests during the pendency
of the arbitration." (Art. 10.18.3).
New to CAFTA:
Does not allow a claim to be
submitted if the claimant
"previously submitted the same
alleged breach to an administrative
tribunal or court of the respondent,
or to any other binding dispute
settlement procedure, for
adjudication or resolution."
(Art. 10.18.4).
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Selection ofArbitrators_______ ___________
Allows ninety days from the date
the claim is submitted for the
tribunal to be established. If the
tribunal is not formed during that
time the Secretary-General, at the
request of one of the parties, shall
appoint an arbiter who is on a
designated list and is not a
national of either party to the
dispute. (Art. 1124(2)).
Allows only seventy-five days
from the date the claim is
submitted for the tribunal to
be established and does not
limit the Secretary-General's
discretion in appointing
arbitrators. (Art. 10.19.3).
Conduct of the Arbitration_________________
"On written notice to the disputing
parties, a Party may make
submissions to a Tribunal on a
question of interpretation of this
Agreement." (Art. 1128).
No notice requirement for oral or
written submissions by non-
disputing Parties. (Art. 10.20.2).
New to CAFTA:
"The tribunal shall have the
authority to accept and consider
amicus curiae submissions from a
person or entity that is not a
disputing party." (Art. 10.20.3).
Allows for an objection that the
claim is not one in which the
tribunal has the authority to grant
an award. The Tribunal is to
assume all claimant's factual
allegations are true and consider all
relevant facts. (Art. 10.20.4). This
objection must be decided within
150 days, but may add thirty days if
a hearing is required and thirty days
for "extraordinary cause." (Art.
10.20.5). Attorney's fees are
recoverable for defending frivolous
objections. (Art. 10.20.6).
Interior Appellate Review: On
request of a disputing party, the
tribunal shall submit a copy of its
proposed decision for comment for
sixty days. The tribunal must then
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Transparency ofArbifral Proceedings
Either disputing party decides
whether to publish the award,
unless Mexico is a disputing party
in which case the award is
published in accordance with the
applicable arbitration rules.
(Art. 1137(4)& Annex 1137.4).
issue an award within forty-five
days after the expiration of the sixty
day comment window.
(Art. 10.20.9).
"[T]he Parties shall strive to reach
an agreement that would have [a
multilateral] appellate body review
awards." (Art. 10.20.10).
The notice of intent, notice of
arbitration, pleadings,
memorials, minutes or
transcripts of hearings, orders,
awards, and decisions of the
tribunal shall be made available
to the public. (Art. 10.21.1).
New to CAFTA:
Hearings shall be open to the
public subject to necessary
arrangements to not disclose
protected information.
(Art. 10.21.2).
Information is protected from
disclosure if the party clearly
designates the information as
protected "at the time it is
submitted to the tribunal."
However, the party must also
"submit a redacted version of
the document" that will then be
provided to non-disputing
parties and to the public.
(Art. 10.21.4).
"Nothing in this Section requires a
respondent to withhold from the
public information required to be
disclosed by its laws." (Art. 10.21.5).
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Governing Law
"An interpretation by the
Commission of a provision of this
Agreement shall be binding on a
Tribunal established under this
Section." (Art. 1131(2)).
Consolidation
A disputing party seeking
consolidation shall specify in its
request to the Secretary-General
the name of the parties against
which the order is sought; the
nature of the order sought; and the
grounds on which the order is
sought. (Art. 1126(3)).
Within sixty days of the request
for consolidation, the Secretary-
General shall establish a tribunal
by appointing three arbitrators
from designated lists consisting of
one national from each disputing
side. (Art. 1126(5)).
The interpretation is binding on a
Tribunal established under this
Section and "any decision or award
issued by the tribunal must be
consistent with that decision."
(Art. 10.22(3)).
New to CAFTA:
The law to be applied is that
"specified in the pertinent
investment agreement or
investment authorization, or as the
disputing parties may otherwise
agree." If no law is specified then
the tribunal shall apply the
respondent's law, including its
conflict of law rules, and any
applicable rules of international law
that may be applicable.
(Art. 10.22.2).
In addition to the requirements
already mentioned in NAFTA, the
request should also include the
addresses of the parties involved.
(Art. 10.25.2).
Unless otherwise agreed upon, the
tribunal (to be established within
sixty days of the request for
consolidation) shall consist of: one
arbitrator appointed by agreement
of the plaintiffs; one by the
respondent; and the presiding
arbitrator appointed by the
Secretary-General as long as he or
she is not a national of any of the
parties. (Art. 10.25.4).
If after sixty days the tribunal is not
yet constituted, the Secretary-
General shall appoint any necessary
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arbitrators - claimant's arbitrator
must be a national of one of the
claimants and respondent's
arbitrator must be a national of the
respondent's state. (Art. 10.25.5).
New to CAFTA:
"Unless the Secretary-General finds
within [thirty] days... that the
[consolidation] request is
manifestly unfounded, a tribunal
shall be established under this
Article." (Art. 10.25.3).
The consolidation tribunal may
order a tribunal previously
established under this Section to
"assume jurisdiction over, and hear
and determine together, all or part
of the claims." However, "at the
request of any claimant not
previously a disputing party before
that tribunal... the arbitrator for
the claimants shall be appointed
pursuant to" the consolidation
mechanism for appointment of
arbitrators. Furthermore, the
"tribunal shall decide whether any
prior hearing shall be repeated."
(Art. 10.25.6).
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